due process clause in California

2026We agree.15 “[T]he admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 ; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 70 .) “ ‘Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process.

2026Our Supreme Court has stated “the admission of evidence, 14. even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 .) “Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evidence is subject to the traditional Watson test .…” (Ibid.; see generally People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075 , 1103–1104 [evaluating trial court’s ruling on hearsay objection under Watson]; People v. McDaniel (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 986 , 1005–1006 [evaluating the erroneous admission of text messages und

2026Proc., § 410.10.)4 “A state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has not been served with process within the state comports with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal Constitution if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444 (Vons), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 .) “Under the minimum contacts test

2023INTRODUCTION The due process clause of the United States Constitution “does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.” (International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 319 (International Shoe).) As such, “[t]he existence of personal jurisdiction . . . depends upon the presence of reasonable notice to the defendant that an action has been brought . . . and a sufficient connection between the defendant and the forum State to make it fair to require defense o

2026(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 .) But the admission of evidence only results in a due process violation when “ ‘there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence,’ ” such that its admission rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.

2025(People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 .) But if the admission results in a due process violation by making the trial fundamentally unfair, we apply the more stringent prejudice standard in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .

2024(See People v. Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 966 .) IV Shifted-Burden-of-Proof Claim The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.” (In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358, 364 .) Addiego contends the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof onto the defense by (1) asking him if he would have agreed to show text messages on his phone to the deputy if the deputy had asked, (2) eliciting testimony from the digital forensics detec

2023The Supreme Court held that under this statutory scheme, placing the burden of proving heat of passion on the defendant violated “the due process requirement, as defined in [Winship, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 364 ], that the prosecution prove 17 PEOPLE v. SCHULLER Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.” (Mullaney, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 685 .) In its analysis, the court acknowledged that “as a formal matter[,] the absence of the heat of passion on sudden provocation is not a ‘fact necessary to constitute the crime’ of [murd

2026“Under the ‘cumulative error’ doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial.” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fn. 32 .) Cumulative error is essentially a due process claim.

2026“Under the ‘cumulative error’ doctrine, errors that are individually harmless may nevertheless have a cumulative effect that is prejudicial.” (In re Avena (1996) 12 Cal.4th 694, 772, fn. 32 .) A claim of cumulative error is essentially a due process claim.

2026A Legal Standards “The prosecution’s duty to disclose and retain evidence stems from the due process clause of the United States Constitution, as explained and interpreted by the three leading United States Supreme Court decisions on this subject— Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 ; Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479 , and Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 (Youngblood ). [¶] Brady is the leading case on the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. ‘[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to

2026A Legal Standards “The prosecution’s duty to disclose and retain evidence stems from the due process clause of the United States Constitution, as explained and interpreted by the three leading United States Supreme Court decisions on this subject— Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 ; Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479 , and Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 (Youngblood ). [¶] Brady is the leading case on the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. ‘[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to

2026Proc., § 410.10.)4 “A state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has not been served with process within the state comports with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal Constitution if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444 (Vons), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 .) “Under the minimum contacts test

2026Proc., § 410.10.)4 “A state court’s assertion of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant who has not been served with process within the state comports with the requirements of the due process clause of the federal Constitution if the defendant has such minimum contacts with the state that the assertion of jurisdiction does not violate ‘ “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” ’ ” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444 (Vons), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316 .) “Under the minimum contacts test

2025DISCUSSION “Both the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and state law prohibit the state from trying or convicting a criminal defendant while he or she is mentally incompetent.” (People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826 , 846–847 (Rogers).) “If, during the pendency of an action and prior to judgment, . . . a doubt arises in the mind of the judge as to the mental competence of the defendant, the judge shall state that doubt in the record and inquire of the attorney for the defendant whether, in the opinion of the attorney, the defendant is mentally co

2025Cumulative Error Defendant claims cumulative error, which “is present when the combined effect of the trial court’s errors is prejudicial or harmful to the defendant.” (People v. Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1017 ; accord, People v. Winbush (2017) 2 Cal.5th 402, 487 ; People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 897 .) “A claim of cumulative error is in essence a due process claim and is often presented as such (see, e.g., People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 911 ). ‘The “litmus test” for cumulative error “is whether defendant received due process and a fair trial.”’” (People v. Rivas (2013) 214

2026A Legal Standards “The prosecution’s duty to disclose and retain evidence stems from the due process clause of the United States Constitution, as explained and interpreted by the three leading United States Supreme Court decisions on this subject— Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 ; Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479 , and Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 (Youngblood ). [¶] Brady is the leading case on the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. ‘[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to

2026A Legal Standards “The prosecution’s duty to disclose and retain evidence stems from the due process clause of the United States Constitution, as explained and interpreted by the three leading United States Supreme Court decisions on this subject— Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83 ; Trombetta, supra, 467 U.S. 479 , and Arizona v. Youngblood (1988) 488 U.S. 51 (Youngblood ). [¶] Brady is the leading case on the prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence. ‘[T]he suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to

2026The People responded that the release of the knife to the victim’s next of kin was not in bad faith and pursuant to Arizona v. Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. 51 , it did not create a due process violation.

2026The People responded that the release of the knife to the victim’s next of kin was not in bad faith and pursuant to Arizona v. Youngblood, supra, 488 U.S. 51 , it did not create a due process violation.

2026(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) 29 No Cumulative Prejudicial Error Finally, Machleit contends that, regardless of whether the asserted errors were individually prejudicial, the “combined effect of multiple trial errors” rendered the trial fundamentally unfair creating a due process violation or alternatively establishes prejudice.

2026(Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) 29 No Cumulative Prejudicial Error Finally, Machleit contends that, regardless of whether the asserted errors were individually prejudicial, the “combined effect of multiple trial errors” rendered the trial fundamentally unfair creating a due process violation or alternatively establishes prejudice.

2026In Falsetta, our Supreme Court considered a due process challenge to another exception to the rule against propensity evidence: section 1108, which allows such evidence in sex offense cases if the evidence is admissible under section 352. (§ 1108, subd. (a); see Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 921-922.) Falsetta 9 held that “the trial court’s discretion to exclude propensity evidence under section 352 saves section 1108 from defendant’s due process challenge.” (Id. at p. 917.) Section 352 provides “ ‘a safeguard against the use of uncharged . . . offenses in cases where the admission of suc

2026In Falsetta, our Supreme Court considered a due process challenge to another exception to the rule against propensity evidence: section 1108, which allows such evidence in sex offense cases if the evidence is admissible under section 352. (§ 1108, subd. (a); see Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 921-922.) Falsetta 9 held that “the trial court’s discretion to exclude propensity evidence under section 352 saves section 1108 from defendant’s due process challenge.” (Id. at p. 917.) Section 352 provides “ ‘a safeguard against the use of uncharged . . . offenses in cases where the admission of suc

2025Applicable Law and Standard of Review “In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question . . . is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269 , quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 .) The California Constitution requires the same standard.

2025On a due process challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, the reviewing court does not “ ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] Instead the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307 , 318–319.) We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determin

2023Instead, ‘ “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” ’ ” (People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 68 .) “[W]e evaluate and balance these three elements in order to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause requires Anders’s ‘prophylactic’ procedures for fundamental fairness: (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the state’s interests involved; and (3) the risk that the absence of the procedures in question will lead to an erroneous resolution of 12 PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. the

2022Instead, ‘ “[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.” ’ ” (People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 68 .) “[W]e evaluate and balance these three elements in order to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause requires Anders’s ‘prophylactic’ procedures for fundamental fairness: (1) the private interests at stake; (2) the state’s interests involved; and (3) the risk that the absence of the procedures in question will lead to an erroneous resolution of 12 PEOPLE v. DELGADILLO Opinion of the Court by Groban, J. the

2025Rather, it is the exceptional case presenting extreme facts where a due process violation will be found.” (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1005 .) Under such a claim, the questions are whether there are “ ‘interests that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality’ ” and whether “ ‘the average judge in [their] position is “likely” to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional “potential for bias.” ’ ” (People v. Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1005 .) “The appellate court’s role is not to examine whether the trial judge’s behavior left something to be desired, or whether some

2025Rather, it is the exceptional case presenting extreme facts where a due process violation will be found.” (People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1005 .) Under such a claim, the questions are whether there are “ ‘interests that tempt adjudicators to disregard neutrality’ ” and whether “ ‘the average judge in [their] position is “likely” to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional “potential for bias.” ’ ” (People v. Freeman, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1005 .) “The appellate court’s role is not to examine whether the trial judge’s behavior left something to be desired, or whether some

2021(Id. at pp. 642–648.) Because “a right to due consideration of parole applications necessarily gives rise to a concomitant right to an available remedy.… [¶] ... [¶] ... due process requires that the [Board] support its determinations with a statement of its reasons therefor.” (In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258 , 268–270.) Further, courts may conduct limited judicial review of parole denials to determine whether the denials are supported by “some evidence,” given that a denial without “some evidence” would be “arbitrary and capricious, thereby depriving the prisoner of due process of law.” ( Ro

2021(Id. at pp. 642–648.) Because “a right to due consideration of parole applications necessarily gives rise to a concomitant right to an available remedy.… [¶] ... [¶] ... due process requires that the [Board] support its determinations with a statement of its reasons therefor.” (In re Sturm (1974) 11 Cal.3d 258 , 268–270.) Further, courts may conduct limited judicial review of parole denials to determine whether the denials are supported by “some evidence,” given that a denial without “some evidence” would be “arbitrary and capricious, thereby depriving the prisoner of due process of law.” ( Ro

2024A jury instruction may so infuse the trial with unfairness as to deny due process of law.” (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 655 [cleaned up].) But a due process violation does not result every time a trial court gives an instruction that is ambiguous, inconsistent, or deficient in some respect.

2024(See Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 660 [rejecting the defendant’s due process claim that giving the certainty instruction denied him the opportunity to present a complete defense on the issue of identity].) While the prosecutor did seize upon the fact that Doe was 100 percent certain of her identification in the photographic identification, the jurors watched the video recording of the identification process and could therefore assess for themselves Doe’s demeanor and level of attention when she picked Bernabe’s 7 Because we conclude that Bernabe suffered no prejudice from the purported inst

2026We agree.15 “[T]he admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 ; Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 70 .) “ ‘Only if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the evidence can its admission violate due process.

2026As we have explained, the court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Sharon’s testimony, and while the trial court did not explain the limited, nonhearsay purpose of Sharon’s testimony, that omission did not “ ‘so infect[ ] the entire trial that the resulting conviction violate[d] due process.’ ” (Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72 ; cf. People v. Johnson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 976, 985-986 [instructional error compels reversal per se where the trial court lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof below the due process requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt].) III.

2025A. General Legal Principles “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or the due process clause of article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence – that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value – from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4

2023A. Standard of Review “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or the due process clause of article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value— 4. from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 115

2023Applicable Law and Standard of Review “In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question we ask is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Rowland (1992) 4 Cal.4th 238, 269 , quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 ; People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1175 .) “We apply an identical standard under the California Constit

2023Sufficiency of Evidence “ ‘In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the question we ask is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ [Citations.] We apply an identical standard under the California Constitution. [Citation.] ‘In determining whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellate court

2026Waiver of Right to Be Present “A criminal defendant, broadly stated, has a right to be personally present at trial under various provisions of law, including the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself; section 15 of article I of the California Constitution; and sections 977 and 1043.” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 741 .) However, “a defendant may waive his right to be present at his trial by being disru

2023(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 725 [ruling on admissibility of evidence reviewed for abuse of discretion].) Because Gudino fails to explain how admitting Cathey’s statement rises to the level of a constitutional error, we examine prejudice under the standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 — whether “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Id. at p. 836; People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 [erroneous admission of evidence results in a due process violation only if it renders the tri

2025COMPETENCY HEARINGS “The due process clause of the federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment prohibits trying a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent.” (People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 517 (Ary).) “A defendant is deemed competent to stand trial only if he ‘“has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding”’ and ‘“has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”’” (Ibid., quoting Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402 .) “When a trial court is presented with evidence that raises

2024COMPETENCY HEARINGS “The due process clause of the federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment prohibits trying a criminal defendant who is mentally incompetent. [Citation.] A defendant is deemed competent to stand trial only if he “‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a 4 reasonable degree of rational understanding’” and “‘has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”’” (People v. Ary (2011) 51 Cal.4th 510, 517 (Ary), quoting Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 402 .) “When a trial court is presented with evidence that rais