due process clause in New Hampshire

2013State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231-33 (1983). ‘Where governmental action would affect a legally protected interest, the due process clause of the New Hampshire Constitution guarantees to the holder of the interest the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Appeal of Pennichuck Water Works, 160 N.H. at 36 (quotation omitted); Appeal of Town of Nottingham, 153 N.H. 539, 551 (2006) (“where issues of fact are presented for resolution by an administrative agency due process requires a meaningful opportunity to be heard” (quotation and brackets omitted)).

1999We will first analyze the defendant’s due process claim under the New Hampshire Constitution, see State v. Ball, 124 N.H. 226, 231 , 471 A.2d 347, 350-51 (1983), relying on cases interpreting the Federal Constitution only to aid in our analysis.

2023See Appeal of Ann Miles Builder, 150 N.H. 315, 320 (2003) (stating that a judgment will not be disturbed for an error that did not affect the outcome below or cause the appealing party injury); McIntire v. Woodall, 140 N.H. 228, 230 (1995) (stating that a party will not prevail on a due process claim absent a showing of actual prejudice).

2014See id. (finding plaintiff had “not identified anything he was unable to do via video-conference that he could have done had he been physically present in the courtroom”); cf. McIntire v. Woodall, 140 N.H. 228, 230 (1995) (explaining that, to prevail on a due process claim, plaintiff must demonstrate actual prejudice).

2025“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness,” which “requires that government conduct conform to the community’s sense of justice, decency and fair play.” Id. (quotation omitted). [¶13] “We engage in a two-part analysis [when] addressing procedural due process claims: first, we determine whether the individual has an interest that entitles him or her to due process protection; and second, if such an interest exists, we determine what process is due.” Gantert v. City of Rochester, 168 N.H. 640, 647 (2016) (quotation omitted).

2024“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness.” State v. Veale, 158 N.H. 632, 637 (2009) (quotation omitted). [¶20] Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution provides in part: “No subject shall be . . . deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” N.H.

2007Under the Federal Constitution, analyzing a party’s due process claim requires review of three factors: “First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335 .

2002On appeal, Tammy G. argues that the probate court’s order denying her counsel was erroneous because it: (1) violated her due process rights under the United States and New Hampshire Constitutions; (2) failed to consider the proper factors of the due process analysis, as enumerated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); and (3) failed to address her request under the probate court’s discretionary authority.

2005We acknowledge that the majority of federal circuit courts of appeal, in reliance upon a line of United States Supreme Court cases consisting of United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 , and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), has “held that, in order to establish that a lengthy pre-indictment delay rises to the level of a due process violation, a defendant must show not only actual substantial prejudice, but also that the government intentionally delayed the indictment to gain an unfair tactical

1986The due process clause has also been recognized as having “a limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay.” United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977); see also United States v. Marion, supra at 324.

2005We acknowledge that the majority of federal circuit courts of appeal, in reliance upon a line of United States Supreme Court cases consisting of United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977), United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 , and Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), has “held that, in order to establish that a lengthy pre-indictment delay rises to the level of a due process violation, a defendant must show not only actual substantial prejudice, but also that the government intentionally delayed the indictment to gain an unfair tactical

1991In the context of cases such as this, the due process clause has a “‘limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay.’” State v. Varagianis, 128 N.H. 226, 228 , 512 A.2d 1117, 1119 (1986) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977)).

2016Div. of Motor Vehicles, 151 N.H. 315, 320 (2004) (“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness”).

2016“Fundamental fairness requires that government conduct conform to the community’s sense of justice, decency and fair play.” Saviano, 151 N.H. at 320 .

1997These special jurisdictional rules are grounded in the belief that it would violate the “notions of fair play and substantial justice,” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotations omitted), embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see id., to subject a nonresident physician with an essentially local practice to the jurisdiction of a foreign court based on the actions of an emergency room patient.

1997These special jurisdictional rules are grounded in the belief that it would violate the “notions of fair play and substantial justice,” International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotations omitted), embodied in the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, see id., to subject a nonresident physician with an essentially local practice to the jurisdiction of a foreign court based on the actions of an emergency room patient.

2018"However, because New Hampshire's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident to the extent permissible under the Federal Due Process Clause, the due process analysis is normally dispositive of the matter." Id . (quotation and citation omitted); see also Metcalf v. Lawson , 148 N.H. 35 , 37, 802 A.2d 1221 (2002) (stating that, in determining whether a New Hampshire court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, "our primary analysis relates to due process").

2018"However, because New Hampshire's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident to the extent permissible under the Federal Due Process Clause, the due process analysis is normally dispositive of the matter." Id . (quotation and citation omitted); see also Metcalf v. Lawson , 148 N.H. 35 , 37, 802 A.2d 1221 (2002) (stating that, in determining whether a New Hampshire court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, "our primary analysis relates to due process").

2009Although Peerless’ brief could be read to assert a due process violation for delay in bringing the instant action, see, e.g., State v. Varagianis, 128 N.H. 226, 228 (1986), our review of the proceedings below shows that Peerless advances this argument for the first time on appeal.

1991In the context of cases such as this, the due process clause has a “‘limited role to play in protecting against oppressive delay.’” State v. Varagianis, 128 N.H. 226, 228 , 512 A.2d 1117, 1119 (1986) (quoting United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 789 (1977)).

2025Because we have consistently interpreted the New Hampshire long arm statute, RSA 510:4, I, “to grant jurisdiction whenever the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution are satisfied,” Staffing Network v. Pietropaolo, 145 N.H. 456, 458 (2000), “the due process analysis is normally dispositive of the matter,” Sweeney, 167 N.H. at 32 .

2021To the extent that any of the defendants’ arguments could be interpreted as contending that the long-arm statute’s requirements are not met in this case, we decline to address those arguments given the defendants’ acknowledgement that “[b]ecause New Hampshire’s long arm-statute, RSA 510:4, authorizes a court to exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent permissible under the Due Process Clause, the analysis depends upon due process.” See RSA 510:4, I (2010); Sweeney, 167 N.H. at 32 (noting that “the due process analysis is normally dispositive”).

2019State Prison for Women , 159 N.H. 465 , 469, 986 A.2d 579 (2009) (holding that the defendant's assertion of inadequate notice during parole revocation process did not rise to a due process violation without a demonstration that she was prejudiced by the claimed defect); State v. Graf , 143 N.H. 294 , 302, 726 A.2d 1270 (1999) (noting that we assess due process claims under the principles of fundamental fairness, meaning that a violation will occur when the procedure employed "gives a party a significant advantage or places a party in a position of prejudice or allows a party to reap the benefi

2019State Prison for Women , 159 N.H. 465 , 469, 986 A.2d 579 (2009) (holding that the defendant's assertion of inadequate notice during parole revocation process did not rise to a due process violation without a demonstration that she was prejudiced by the claimed defect); State v. Graf , 143 N.H. 294 , 302, 726 A.2d 1270 (1999) (noting that we assess due process claims under the principles of fundamental fairness, meaning that a violation will occur when the procedure employed "gives a party a significant advantage or places a party in a position of prejudice or allows a party to reap the benefi

2025Because we have consistently interpreted the New Hampshire long arm statute, RSA 510:4, I, “to grant jurisdiction whenever the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution are satisfied,” Staffing Network v. Pietropaolo, 145 N.H. 456, 458 (2000), “the due process analysis is normally dispositive of the matter,” Sweeney, 167 N.H. at 32 .

2004See Staffing Network, 145 N.H. at 459 .

2025“The ultimate standard for judging a due process claim is the notion of fundamental fairness,” which “requires that government conduct conform to the community’s sense of justice, decency and fair play.” Id. (quotation omitted). [¶13] “We engage in a two-part analysis [when] addressing procedural due process claims: first, we determine whether the individual has an interest that entitles him or her to due process protection; and second, if such an interest exists, we determine what process is due.” Gantert v. City of Rochester, 168 N.H. 640, 647 (2016) (quotation omitted).

2016See Gantert, 168 N.H. at 648 .

2022Therefore, to establish a due process violation 5 when disparate sentences are imposed by two different judges, the defendant “must prove actual vindictiveness.” State v. Hurlburt, 135 N.H. 143, 147 (1991) (decided under Federal Constitution) (quotation omitted); see Smith, 490 U.S. at 799-800 ; cf. Landry, 131 N.H. at 67-68 (discussing resentencing after de novo appeal to superior court).

1995Steed does not argue that the due process analysis of State v. Hurlburt, 135 N.H. 143, 147-48 , 603 A.2d 493, 495-96 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1008 (1992), applies to this case.

2021“Fundamental fairness requires that government conduct conform to the community’s sense of justice, decency and fair play.” Id. (quotation omitted); see Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 379 (1986) (“The degree of procedural protection required varies and must be determined with reference both to the individual right or expectation in question and to the public interest that justifies a limitation on the right.” (citations omitted)).

2020Baker v. Cunningham, 128 N.H. 374, 380-81 (1986).

2020Furthermore, “before we will evaluate a due process claim, [the party making the claim] must show actual prejudice.” Appeal of Omega Entm’t, 156 N.H. 282, 287 (2007).

2010“Judicial review is not warranted for complaints regarding adverse rulings without developed legal argument, and neither passing *160 reference to constitutional claims nor off-hand invocations of constitutional rights without support by legal argument or authority warrants extended consideration.” Appeal of Omega Entm’t, 156 N.H. 282, 287 (2007).

2018See Francis v. Franklin , 471 U.S. 307 , 313-14, 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985).

2018See Francis v. Franklin , 471 U.S. 307 , 313-14, 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985).

2015See State v. Fletcher, 158 N.H. 207, 209-10 (2009) (“Due process requires a sentencing court to clearly communicate to the defendant the exact nature of the sentence as well as the extent to which the court retains discretion to modify it or impose it at a later date.” (quotation omitted)).

2011See Fletcher, 158 N.H. at 210 .

2014“The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness.” Id. at 728 (emphasis added); see also State v. Addison, 160 N.H. 792, 801-02 (2010) (holding that the Biggers analysis does not apply to either in-court or out-of-court identification in the absence of improper state action).

2014“The fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a *789 trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness.” Id. at 728 (emphasis added); see also State v. Addison, 160 N.H. 792, 801-02 (2010) (holding that the Biggers analysis does not apply to either in-court or out-of-court identification in the absence of improper state action).

2014“Although we construe our statutes providing personal jurisdiction over nonresidents to the full constitutional limit, we also consistently require strict compliance with statutory requirements for service of process.” Id. at 487 (citation and quotation omitted); see also Estate of Lunt v. Gaylor, 150 N.H. 96, 97 (2003). ‘Where a statute points out a particular method of serving process[,] such method must be followed.” South Down Recreation Assoc., 141 N.H. at 487 (quotation and ellipses omitted).

2010“Proper service is separate from the due process requirement that the defendant have minimum contacts with the jurisdiction.” Estate of Lunt v. Gaylor, 150 N.H. 96, 97 (2003) (quotation omitted).

1991Id. at 112 .

1978United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); see N.H.

1976Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 , 155 n. 21, 196 ff. (1974); Local 134 v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 863 (7thCir. 1973); rev’dsub nom.

1975In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), it: was held that the due process clause of the fourteenth' amendment mandated thatTan evidentiary hearing had to be held before welfare benefits could be terminated.

2022We will uphold a ruling on a due process claim unless the ruling is “erroneous as a matter of law.” Id.

2022We will uphold a ruling on a due process claim unless the ruling is “erroneous as a matter of law.” Id.

2022“Where investigative, accusative, and adjudicative functions are commingled within a single administrative agency, a party alleging a due process violation must show actual bias to prevail.” Id.

2019Appeal of Mullen, 169 N.H. 392, 399 (2016).

1995Where “there is a protected property interest, the due process inquiry, reduced to its core, is one of ‘fundamental fairness.’ ” First NH Bank v. Town of Windham, 138 N.H. 319, 326 , 639 A.2d 1089, 1094 (1994).

1995Where “there is a protected property interest, the due process inquiry, reduced to its core, is one of ‘fundamental fairness.’ ” First NH Bank v. Town of Windham, 138 N.H. 319, 326 , 639 A.2d 1089, 1094 (1994).

2019See id.

2016Id.

2018We have ruled that "[a]n instruction that creates a mandatory presumption of criminal intent violates the due process requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt." Hall , 148 N.H. at 398 , 808 A.2d 55 .

2018We have ruled that "[a]n instruction that creates a mandatory presumption of criminal intent violates the due process requirement that the State prove every element of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt." Hall , 148 N.H. at 398 , 808 A.2d 55 .