709 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1920–2026 124 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Yoost v. Casparigreen2 sentences2019Third, the defendant’s activities must be substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. [Yoost, 295 Mich App at 223 (quotation marks and citation omitted).] “When undertaking a due process analysis case by case, a court should examine the defendant’s own conduct and connection with the forum to determine whether the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” WH Froh, Inc, 252 Mich App at 230 . -4- The first part of the test requires “purposeful availment,” which is “a deliberate undertaking to do or cause an 2019Third, the defendant’s activities must be substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. [Yoost, 295 Mich App at 223 (internal citation omitted).] “When undertaking a due process analysis case by case, a court should examine the defendant's own conduct and connection with the forum to determine whether the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” W H Froh, Inc, 252 Mich App at 230 . | 7 | 7 |
People of Michigan v. Vicki Renee Dickinsongreen2 sentences2026“When the evidence is only potentially useful, a failure to preserve the evidence does not amount to a due-process violation unless a defendant establishes bad faith.” Dickinson, 321 Mich App at 16 (quotation marks and citation omitted). 2026“When the evidence is only ‘potentially useful,’ a failure to preserve the evidence does not amount to a due-process violation unless a defendant establishes bad faith.” Id., quoting Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58 ; 109 S Ct 333 ; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988). | 6 | 17 |
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.green2 sentences2022We evaluate whether a particular parent was afforded minimal due process on a case-by-case basis. [Id. at 122.] In Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306, 314-315 ; 70 S Ct 652 ; 94 L Ed 865 (1950), the United States Supreme Court explained regarding the due-process requirement of notice: The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. 2022We evaluate whether a particular parent was afforded minimal due process on a case-by-case basis. [Id. at 122.] In Mullane v Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co, 339 US 306, 314-315 ; 70 S Ct 652 ; 94 L Ed 865 (1950), the United States Supreme Court explained regarding the due-process requirement of notice: The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. | 4 | 14 |
Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Incgreen2 sentences2025“The ‘constitutional touchstone’ of a due process analysis with respect to personal jurisdiction is whether the defendant purposely established the minimum contacts with the forum state necessary to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant fair and reasonable.” Oberlies, 246 Mich App at 433 (citations omitted). 2023See Oberlies, 246 Mich App at 430 (stating that “[t]he only real limitation placed on this long arm statute is the due process clause”) (quotation marks and citation omitted; quotation cleaned up). | 4 | 9 |
Perry v. New Hampshiregreen2 sentences2020Yet, as the federal Supreme Court recognized in Perry v New Hampshire, 565 US 228, 245-248 ; 132 S Ct 716 ; 181 L Ed 2d 694 (2012), when the identification challenged was not arranged by law enforcement—but rather occurred during judicial proceedings—the due-process clause is not implicated. 1 It appears that one of the three witnesses was actually sitting at the witness’s stand at this time, while the other two witnesses were seated outside the courtroom. -2- Perry makes clear that, for those defendants who are identified under suggestive circumstances not arranged by police, the requirements 2020Yet, as the federal Supreme Court recognized in Perry v New Hampshire, 565 US 228, 245-248 ; 132 S Ct 716 ; 181 L Ed 2d 694 (2012), when the identification challenged was not arranged by law enforcement—but rather occurred during judicial proceedings—the due-process clause is not implicated. 1 It appears that one of the three witnesses was actually sitting at the witness’s stand at this time, while the other two witnesses were seated outside the courtroom. -2- Perry makes clear that, for those defendants who are identified under suggestive circumstances not arranged by police, the requirements | 4 | 9 |
Neil v. Biggersgreen2 sentences2023Neil v Biggers, 409 US 188, 196, 201 ; 93 S Ct 375 ; 34 L Ed 2d 401 (1972); People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 302 ; 505 NW2d 528 (1993). 2020With respect to the burden of proof, in Kurylczyk, we held that “In order to sustain a due process challenge, a defendant must show that the pretrial identification procedure was so suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances that it led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.” Id. at 302 (opinion by GRIFFIN, J.), citing Biggers, 409 US at 196 . | 4 | 6 |
| Bay County Prosecutor v. Nugentgreen | 4 | 4 |
People v Ryangreen2 sentences2022See People v Ryan, 451 Mich 30, 35-36 ; 545 NW2d 612 (1996) (holding that prosecutorial vindictiveness constitutes a due process violation). 2022See People v Ryan, 451 Mich 30, 35-36 ; 545 NW2d 612 (1996) (holding that prosecutorial vindictiveness constitutes a due process violation). | 3 | 12 |
People v. Carinesgreen2 sentences2020Because defendant did not meet his burden to show that substantial prejudice and a tactical advantage resulted from the prearrest delay in this case, id., he has not shown plain error affecting his substantial rights, and his claim of a due-process violation must fail, Carines, 460 Mich at 763 . 5. 2017Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764 . -11- The state’s failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a due process violation unless the defendant can demonstrate bad faith. | 3 | 11 |
In Re WINSHIPgreen2 sentences2019People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 366 ; 285 NW2d 284 (1979), citing In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364 ; 90 S Ct 1068 ; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970). 2019People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 366 ; 285 NW2d 284 (1979), citing In re Winship, 397 US 358, 364 ; 90 S Ct 1068 ; 25 L Ed 2d 368 (1970). | 3 | 9 |
| In Re JKgreen | 3 | 6 |
| Shavers v. Attorney Generalgreen | 3 | 4 |
| Viches v. MLT, INC.green | 3 | 3 |
| Mooney v. Holohangreen | 3 | 3 |
| Manson v. Brathwaitegreen | 3 | 3 |
People v. Kurylczykgreen2 sentences2025To prevail on a due-process challenge, “a defendant must show that the pretrial identification procedure was so suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances that it led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.” Kurylczyk, 443 Mich at 302 . 2023“In order to sustain a due process challenge, a defendant must show that the pretrial identification procedure was so suggestive in light of the totality of the circumstances that it led to a substantial likelihood of misidentification.” People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 302 ; 505 NW2d 528 (1993). | 2 | 31 |
People v. Chenaultgreen2 sentences2025In order to establish such a due-process violation, a defendant must prove “(1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material.” People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 150 ; 845 NW2d 731 (2014). 2025In order to establish such a due-process violation, a defendant must prove “(1) the prosecution has suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material.” People v Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 150 ; 845 NW2d 731 (2014). | 2 | 19 |
People v. McGeegreen2 sentences2026But “to establish a due process violation, a defendant must prove prejudice to his defense.” McGee, 258 Mich App at 700 . 2025“To establish a due process violation, a defendant must prove prejudice to his defense.” McGee, 258 Mich App at 700 ; see also People v Gaines, 306 Mich App 289, 298 ; 856 NW2d 222 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted) (“Prejudice is essential to any claim of inadequate notice.”). | 2 | 12 |
People v. Smithgreen2 sentences2020In People v Smith, 498 Mich 466, 470, 476 ; 870 NW2d 299 (2015), in which the defendant was charged with armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), the Michigan Supreme Court, quoting Napue, 360 US at 269 , acknowledged that the prosecution’s -12- affirmative duty to correct the false testimony of a witness “ ‘does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness.’ ” However, while noting that the prosecution is not obligated to “correct every instance of mistaken or inaccurate testimony” and that it is the impact of the p 2020In People v Smith, 498 Mich 466, 470, 476 ; 870 NW2d 299 (2015), in which the defendant was charged with armed robbery, MCL 750.529, and felony murder, MCL 750.316(1)(b), the Michigan Supreme Court, quoting Napue, 360 US at 269 , acknowledged that the prosecution’s -12- affirmative duty to correct the false testimony of a witness “ ‘does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only to the credibility of the witness.’ ” However, while noting that the prosecution is not obligated to “correct every instance of mistaken or inaccurate testimony” and that it is the impact of the p | 2 | 7 |
| People v. Perrygreen | 2 | 5 |
| Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc.green | 2 | 5 |
| Bay County Prosecutor v. Nugentgreen | 2 | 4 |
| People v. Acevalgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Mettler Walloon, LLC v. Melrose Townshipgreen | 2 | 3 |
| Rochin v. Californiagreen | 2 | 3 |
Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2026“When the evidence is only ‘potentially useful,’ a failure to preserve the evidence does not amount to a due-process violation unless a defendant establishes bad faith.” Id., quoting Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58 ; 109 S Ct 333 ; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988). 2026“When the evidence is only ‘potentially useful,’ a failure to preserve the evidence does not amount to a due-process violation unless a defendant establishes bad faith.” Id., quoting Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58 ; 109 S Ct 333 ; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988). | 1 | 25 |
People of Michigan v. Johnny Ray Kennedygreen2 sentences2022Trial courts must analyze an indigent defendant’s request for funding to hire experts under a due-process framework that considers: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State, (2) the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided, and (3) the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided. [People v Kennedy, 502 Mich 206, 215 ; 917 NW2d 355 (2018) (cleaned up).] “With respect to the first tw 2022Trial courts must analyze an indigent defendant’s request for funding to hire experts under a due-process framework that considers: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the action of the State, (2) the governmental interest that will be affected if the safeguard is to be provided, and (3) the probable value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest if those safeguards are not provided. [People v Kennedy, 502 Mich 206, 215 ; 917 NW2d 355 (2018) (cleaned up).] “With respect to the first tw | 1 | 13 |
Ake v. Oklahomagreen2 sentences2022An indigent defendant’s request for state funds to pay for an expert is analyzed under the due-process framework set forth in Ake v Oklahoma, 470 U S 68; 105 S Ct 1087 ; 84 L Ed 2d 53 (1985). 2022An indigent defendant’s request for state funds to pay for an expert is analyzed under the due-process framework set forth in Ake v Oklahoma, 470 U S 68; 105 S Ct 1087 ; 84 L Ed 2d 53 (1985). | 1 | 13 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2017The primary question, according to the United States Supreme Court, is “whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 476 ; 105 S Ct 2174 ; 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985), quoting Int’l Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 320 ; 66 S Ct 154 ; 90 L Ed 95 (1945). 1 “Even if a defendant’s conduct places him within an enumerated category of MCL 600.705 [or MCL 600.725], a Michigan court may not exercise limited personal jurisdiction over the defendant unless to do so would not offend constitutional due process 2017The primary question, according to the United States Supreme Court, is “whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 476 ; 105 S Ct 2174 ; 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985), quoting Int’l Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 320 ; 66 S Ct 154 ; 90 L Ed 95 (1945). 1 “Even if a defendant’s conduct places him within an enumerated category of MCL 600.705 [or MCL 600.725], a Michigan court may not exercise limited personal jurisdiction over the defendant unless to do so would not offend constitutional due process | 1 | 11 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences2026Lastly, respondent offers a due-process analysis under Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334-335 ; 96 S Ct 893 ; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), and suggests that remaining proceeds should simply be held in escrow for the benefit of foreclosed owners until the owners claim them. 2026Lastly, respondent offers a due-process analysis under Mathews v Eldridge, 424 US 319, 334-335 ; 96 S Ct 893 ; 47 L Ed 2d 18 (1976), and suggests that remaining proceeds should simply be held in escrow for the benefit of foreclosed owners until the owners claim them. | 1 | 9 |
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewiczgreen2 sentences2017The primary question, according to the United States Supreme Court, is “whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 476 ; 105 S Ct 2174 ; 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985), quoting Int’l Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 320 ; 66 S Ct 154 ; 90 L Ed 95 (1945). 1 “Even if a defendant’s conduct places him within an enumerated category of MCL 600.705 [or MCL 600.725], a Michigan court may not exercise limited personal jurisdiction over the defendant unless to do so would not offend constitutional due process 2017The primary question, according to the United States Supreme Court, is “whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Burger King Corp v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 476 ; 105 S Ct 2174 ; 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985), quoting Int’l Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 320 ; 66 S Ct 154 ; 90 L Ed 95 (1945). 1 “Even if a defendant’s conduct places him within an enumerated category of MCL 600.705 [or MCL 600.725], a Michigan court may not exercise limited personal jurisdiction over the defendant unless to do so would not offend constitutional due process | 1 | 8 |
W H Froh, Inc v. Domanskigreen2 sentences2019Third, the defendant’s activities must be substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. [Yoost, 295 Mich App at 223 (quotation marks and citation omitted).] “When undertaking a due process analysis case by case, a court should examine the defendant’s own conduct and connection with the forum to determine whether the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” WH Froh, Inc, 252 Mich App at 230 . -4- The first part of the test requires “purposeful availment,” which is “a deliberate undertaking to do or cause an 2019Third, the defendant’s activities must be substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. [Yoost, 295 Mich App at 223 (quotation marks and citation omitted).] “When undertaking a due process analysis case by case, a court should examine the defendant’s own conduct and connection with the forum to determine whether the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” WH Froh, Inc, 252 Mich App at 230 . -4- The first part of the test requires “purposeful availment,” which is “a deliberate undertaking to do or cause an | 1 | 7 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2018Thus, the defense of double jeopardy, those grounded in the due process clause, those relating to insufficient evidence to bind over at preliminary examination and failure to suppress illegally-obtained evidence without which the people could not proceed are other examples . *541 Wherever it is found that the result of the right asserted would be to prevent the trial from taking place, we follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court and hold a guilty plea does not waive that right. [ [ Id . at] 444, 240 N.W.2d 729 . 1987As such, insufficient notice is a defense "grounded in the due process clause,” Alvin Johnson, supra, and concerns the state’s "authority, as opposed to its capacity” to bring a defendant to trial, Hall, supra. Thus, we feel that by pleading guilty defendant has not waived his right to assert a lack of knowledge of the supplemental information on appeal. | 1 | 7 |
Crampton v. Department of Stategreen2 sentences2003Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that “there may be situations in which the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge ... is so strong as to rise to the level of a due process violation,” Cain, supra at 512-513 n 48, and that a showing of actual bias is not necessary where “ ‘experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’ ” Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347, 351 ; 235 NW2d 352 (1975), quoting Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35, 47 ; 95 S Ct 1456 ; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975). 2003Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that “there may be situations in which the appearance of impropriety on the part of a judge ... is so strong as to rise to the level of a due process violation,” Cain, supra at 512-513 n 48, and that a showing of actual bias is not necessary where “ ‘experience teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’ ” Crampton v Dep’t of State, 395 Mich 347, 351 ; 235 NW2d 352 (1975), quoting Withrow v Larkin, 421 US 35, 47 ; 95 S Ct 1456 ; 43 L Ed 2d 712 (1975). | 1 | 6 |
| People v. Pattongreen | 1 | 6 |
Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Rothgreen2 sentences2020See, e.g., Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564, 577 ; 92 S Ct 2701 ; 33 L Ed2d 548 (1972) (considering whether a property interest exists in continued state employment in a due process claim); Barrington Cove, LP v RI Hous & Mortg Fin Corp, 246 F3d 1, 5-6 (CA 1, 2001) (finding in a due process claim that there was no property interest in a claimed federal tax credit where the federal statute did not prescribe conditions for obtaining the credits); Reed v Village of Shorewood, 704 F2d 943, 948 (CA 7, 1983) (observing that a cognizable property interest “is what is securely and durable yours und 2020See, e.g., Board of Regents v Roth, 408 US 564, 577 ; 92 S Ct 2701 ; 33 L Ed2d 548 (1972) (considering whether a property interest exists in continued state employment in a due process claim); Barrington Cove, LP v RI Hous & Mortg Fin Corp, 246 F3d 1, 5-6 (CA 1, 2001) (finding in a due process claim that there was no property interest in a claimed federal tax credit where the federal statute did not prescribe conditions for obtaining the credits); Reed v Village of Shorewood, 704 F2d 943, 948 (CA 7, 1983) (observing that a cognizable property interest “is what is securely and durable yours und | 1 | 6 |
| Bullington v. Corbellgreen | 1 | 4 |
| Al-Maliki v. LaGrantgreen | 1 | 4 |
| Morrissey v. Brewergreen | 1 | 4 |
| Vlandis v. Klinegreen | 1 | 4 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2023It does not follow that a due process violation should bar retrial, because such a remedy would be unduly broad and would fail to address the specific harm the defendant has suffered. [Citations omitted.] Importantly, “barring retrial on the basis of due process grounds would amount to punishment of society for [the] misdeeds of a prosecutor because it would permit the accused to go free.” Id. (alteration in original, quotation marks omitted), citing Brady, 373 US at 87 . 2019Kelly 5 Further, to the extent defendant’s argument could be viewed as a due-process challenge, see Brady v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 ; 83 S Ct 1194 ; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963), that challenge also fails because, with defendant receiving the transcript, it is clear that the transcript was not suppressed or withheld, see People v Dimambro, 318 Mich App 204 , 212; 897 NW2d 233 (2016) (stating that one of the elements in a Brady due-process claim is that the evidence must have been suppressed by the government). -7- | 12 | 2014–2023 |
People v. Heft
green
2 sentences2026Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58 ; 109 S Ct 333 ; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988); People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 79 ; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). 2026Arizona v Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58 ; 109 S Ct 333 ; 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988); People v Heft, 299 Mich App 69, 79 ; 829 NW2d 266 (2012). | 6 | 2015–2026 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2026“Defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was exculpatory or that the police acted in bad faith.” People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365 ; 494 NW2d 873 (1992). 2026“Defendant bears the burden of showing that the evidence was exculpatory or that the police acted in bad faith.” People v Johnson, 197 Mich App 362, 365 ; 494 NW2d 873 (1992). | 6 | 2016–2026 |
People v. Hanks
green
2 sentences2025A due process challenge to an anonymous jury will only succeed when “something more than just the jurors’ names is withheld from the parties.” Hanks, 276 Mich App at 93 . 2021A due process challenge to an anonymous jury will only succeed when “something more than just the jurors’ names is withheld from the parties.” Hanks, 276 Mich App at 93 . | 6 | 2016–2025 |
People v. Bisard
green
2 sentences2025“The statutory 180-day rule, MCL 780.131 and MCL 780.133, may be invoked to require dismissal of a criminal case only if action is not commenced in the case within 180 days after the prosecutor 7 In his brief on appeal, defendant relies upon People v Bisard, 114, Mich App 784, 790; 319 NW2d 670 (1982), for the proposition that “[w]hen a delay is deliberately undertaken to prejudice a defendant, little actual prejudice need be shown to establish a due process claim.” However, defendant referred to no evidence indicating that delay was undertaken to prejudice his defense. -7- receives the requir 2000Id. at 791 . *109 The Court in McIntire, supra at 94, expressed the Bisará analysis in three parts: [I]n order to establish a due process violation in the context of prearrest delay a defendant must first demonstrate prejudice. | 6 | 1988–2025 |
People v. Vargo
green
2 sentences2022“Among the factors to be considered in determining whether a due process violation has occurred are the reinstitution of charges without additional, noncumulative evidence not introduced at the first preliminary examination, the reinstitution of charges to harass, and judge-shopping to obtain a favorable ruling.” People v Dunbar, 463 Mich 606, 613 ; 625 NW2d 1 (2001), quoting People v Vargo, 139 Mich App 573, 578 ; 362 NW2d 840 (1984). 2022“Among the factors to be considered in determining whether a due process violation has occurred are the reinstitution of charges without additional, noncumulative evidence not introduced at the first preliminary examination, the reinstitution of charges to harass, and judge-shopping to obtain a favorable ruling.” People v Dunbar, 463 Mich 606, 613 ; 625 NW2d 1 (2001), quoting People v Vargo, 139 Mich App 573, 578 ; 362 NW2d 840 (1984). | 6 | 2001–2022 |
Deck v. Missouri
green
2 sentences2019In support, Hampton relies on Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622, 635 ; 125 S Ct 2007 ; 161 L Ed 2d 953 (2005) (“[W]here a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. 2019In support, Hampton relies on Deck v Missouri, 544 US 622, 635 ; 125 S Ct 2007 ; 161 L Ed 2d 953 (2005) (“[W]here a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation. | 6 | 2017–2020 |
| People v. Odom green | 6 | 2016–2017 |
| Withrow v. Larkin green | 6 | 1983–2009 |
| People v. Henry green | 5 | 2016–2021 |
| People v. Gray green | 5 | 2017–2021 |
| Krueger v. Williams green | 5 | 1986–2017 |
| United States v. Lovasco green | 5 | 1982–2016 |
| Miranda v. Arizona green | 4 | 1990–2025 |
| Hill v. Frawley green | 4 | 2014–2025 |
| English v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich. green | 4 | 2006–2025 |
| Aaronson v. Lindsay & Hauer International Ltd. green | 4 | 2004–2025 |
| Mapp v. Ohio green | 4 | 1971–2021 |
| People v. Musser green | 4 | 2017–2020 |
| People v. Hampton green | 4 | 1982–2019 |
| in Re Keyes Estate green | 4 | 2016–2017 |
| Lawrence M Clarke, Inc v. Richco Construction, Inc green | 3 | 2020–2026 |
| People v. Huttenga green | 3 | 2020–2025 |
| Sherrod v. City of Detroit green | 3 | 2017–2025 |
| Giglio v. United States green | 3 | 1977–2025 |
| People v. Barclay green | 3 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Robbins neutral | 3 | 2018–2022 |
| People v. Dunbar green | 3 | 2018–2022 |
| United States v. Marion green | 3 | 2008–2021 |
| Gillette Co. v. Department of Treasury green | 3 | 2018–2020 |
| Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty. green | 3 | 1988–2020 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.