due process clause in Maryland

2011See Att’y Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704 , 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981) (“Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection clause, we deem it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights.”). 18 “It is, perhaps because this State has no express equal protection clause that Article 24 has been interpreted to apply ‘in like manner and to the same extent as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,’ so that ‘decisions of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practi

2011See Att’y Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704 , 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981) (“Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection clause, we deem it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights.”). 18 “It is, perhaps because this State has no express equal protection clause that Article 24 has been interpreted to apply ‘in like manner and to the same extent as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,’ so that ‘decisions of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practi

2011See Att’y Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704 , 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981) (“Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection clause, we deem it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights.”). 18 “It is, perhaps because this State has no express equal protection clause that Article 24 has been interpreted to apply ‘in like manner and to the same extent as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,’ so that ‘decisions of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practi

2011See Att’y Gen. v. Waldron, 289 Md. 683, 704 , 426 A.2d 929, 940-41 (1981) (“Although the Maryland Constitution contains no express equal protection clause, we deem it settled that this concept of equal treatment is embodied in the due process requirement of Article 24 of the Declaration of Rights.”). 18 “It is, perhaps because this State has no express equal protection clause that Article 24 has been interpreted to apply ‘in like manner and to the same extent as the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution,’ so that ‘decisions of the Supreme Court on the Fourteenth Amendment are practi

2007Because there has been no infringement of a constitutionally protected property right sufficient to maintain a claim based on denial of due process, through the final determination of Petitioner’s legal rights to use the Property as originally intended, Williamson Planning Comm’n, 473 U.S. at 197-205 , 105 S.Ct. at 3122-26 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (rejecting a landowner’s property-based procedural due process claim on the grounds that the zoning ordinances at issue did not determine finally the permitted uses of the targeted land); Pitsenberger, 287 Md. at 27-28 , 410 A.2d at 1057 (“[TJhe state action

2007Because there has been no infringement of a constitutionally protected property right sufficient to maintain a claim based on denial of due process, through the final determination of Petitioner’s legal rights to use the Property as originally intended, Williamson Planning Comm’n, 473 U.S. at 197-205 , 105 S.Ct. at 3122-26 , 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (rejecting a landowner’s property-based procedural due process claim on the grounds that the zoning ordinances at issue did not determine finally the permitted uses of the targeted land); Pitsenberger, 287 Md. at 27-28 , 410 A.2d at 1057 (“[TJhe state action

2026See also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort[.]”).

2014The presentation of an alternative does not rise to a due process violation. 21 Id.

2006The seminal case, referred to in the above excerpt from Jenkins , establishing that any provision of law which relieves the prosecution of its burden of proof of every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt implicates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), 5 had been decided *701 six years before Wilkins .

2006The seminal case, referred to in the above excerpt from Jenkins , establishing that any provision of law which relieves the prosecution of its burden of proof of every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt implicates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 , 90 S.Ct. 1068 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), 5 had been decided *701 six years before Wilkins .

2020Whether Plaintiff’s Claims Arise out of Activities Directed at the State The second prong of the due process analysis requires that we consider “whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those activities directed at the State.” Beyond Sys., 388 Md. at 26 .

2020Constitutional Reasonableness Considerations The third prong of the due process analysis for the exercise of specific jurisdiction requires that we consider “whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be constitutionally reasonable.” Beyond Sys., 388 Md. at 26 (citing Carefirst, 334 F.3d at 397 ) (additional citations omitted).

2003As Chief Judge Murphy observed in Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 138 , 383 A.2d 389 (1978): It is true, of course, that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee the right to an impartial jury to an accused in a criminal case; these constitutional guarantees do not, however, insure that a prospective juror will be free of all preconceived notions relating to guilt or innocence, only that he can lay aside his impressions or opinions and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in the case.

2003As Chief Judge Murphy observed in Couser v. State, 282 Md. 125, 138 , 383 A.2d 389 (1978): It is true, of course, that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights guarantee the right to an impartial jury to an accused in a criminal case; these constitutional guarantees do not, however, insure that a prospective juror will be free of all preconceived notions relating to guilt or innocence, only that he can lay aside his impressions or opinions and render a verdict based solely on the evidence presented in the case.

1986Having stated these principles, the Janda Court immediately recognized that “[t]he various categories of matters procedural or those concerning the remedy, and matters of substance, vested or accrued, or not vested or accrued, as well as rights protected by the due process clause, tend to overlap in many instances and are not always easy to accurately recognize or to delineate or define in a given instance.” Id., 170 , 205 A.2d 228 .

1986Having stated these principles, the Janda Court immediately recognized that “[t]he various categories of matters procedural or those concerning the remedy, and matters of substance, vested or accrued, or not vested or accrued, as well as rights protected by the due process clause, tend to overlap in many instances and are not always easy to accurately recognize or to delineate or define in a given instance.” Id., 170 , 205 A.2d 228 .

2002Double Jeopardy Principles Generally Double jeopardy protections have long existed in Maryland common law, 11 see Gianiny v. State, 320 Md. 337, 347 , 577 A.2d 795, 799-800 (1990); Pugh v. State, 271 Md. 701, 705 , 319 A.2d 542, 544 (1974); State v. Barger, 242 Md. 616, 619 , 220 A.2d 304, 306 (1966), and, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), as a matter of federal constitutional law by application to the States of the Fifth Amendment through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti

2002Double Jeopardy Principles Generally Double jeopardy protections have long existed in Maryland common law, 11 see Gianiny v. State, 320 Md. 337, 347 , 577 A.2d 795, 799-800 (1990); Pugh v. State, 271 Md. 701, 705 , 319 A.2d 542, 544 (1974); State v. Barger, 242 Md. 616, 619 , 220 A.2d 304, 306 (1966), and, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 , 89 S.Ct. 2056 , 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969), as a matter of federal constitutional law by application to the States of the Fifth Amendment through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Consti

2014The Court cited, without significant analysis, several Supreme Court decisions on the due process clause, most of which did not concern a right to counsel, as well as Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347 , 464 A.2d 228 (1983), in which this Court held that an indigent defendant who faces incarceration in a civil contempt proceeding has a right to government-furnished counsel. *627 The Sites Court acknowledged that there was scant authority on the precise issue before it and that other state supreme courts had reached the opposite conclusion. 300 Md. at 716-17 , 481 A.2d 192 .

2014The Court cited, without significant analysis, several Supreme Court decisions on the due process clause, most of which did not concern a right to counsel, as well as Rutherford v. Rutherford, 296 Md. 347 , 464 A.2d 228 (1983), in which this Court held that an indigent defendant who faces incarceration in a civil contempt proceeding has a right to government-furnished counsel. *627 The Sites Court acknowledged that there was scant authority on the precise issue before it and that other state supreme courts had reached the opposite conclusion. 300 Md. at 716-17 , 481 A.2d 192 .

2017See Beyond Sys., 388 Md. at 22 , 878 A.2d 567 (“Because we have consistently held that the reach of the long arm statute is coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction delineated under the due process clause ..., our statutory inquiry merges with our constitutional examination.” (citing Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md. 653, 657 , 370 A.2d 551 (1977)). 1.

2017See Beyond Sys., 388 Md. at 22 , 878 A.2d 567 (“Because we have consistently held that the reach of the long arm statute is coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction delineated under the due process clause ..., our statutory inquiry merges with our constitutional examination.” (citing Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md. 653, 657 , 370 A.2d 551 (1977)). 1.

1996It is because “the parental rights of the natural mother and father ... [are] ‘far more precious than property rights’ ... [that they are] protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” In re Adoption No. 85365027/AD, 71 Md.App. 362, 366 , 525 A.2d 1081 (1987) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 , 92 S.Ct 1208, 1211 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)).

1996It is because “the parental rights of the natural mother and father ... [are] ‘far more precious than property rights’ ... [that they are] protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” In re Adoption No. 85365027/AD, 71 Md.App. 362, 366 , 525 A.2d 1081 (1987) (quoting Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 , 92 S.Ct 1208, 1211 , 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972)).

2000This determination must depend “upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 .

2000This determination must depend “upon the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 .

2015In 1986 in *108 Colorado v. Connelly, [ 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ], the Supreme Court ruled that, in order for a confession to be suppressed under the constitutional due process test of voluntariness, “coercive police activity is a predicate.” The Connelly Court concluded: “Even the most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process clause.” Some form of police interrogation is similarly required to trigger the Miranda protections of the Fifth Amendment.

2015In 1986 in *108 Colorado v. Connelly, [ 479 U.S. 157 , 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ], the Supreme Court ruled that, in order for a confession to be suppressed under the constitutional due process test of voluntariness, “coercive police activity is a predicate.” The Connelly Court concluded: “Even the most outrageous behavior by a private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not make that evidence inadmissible under the Due Process clause.” Some form of police interrogation is similarly required to trigger the Miranda protections of the Fifth Amendment.

2025Although acknowledging that the Court in Perry discussed the due process analysis in the context of police-arranged 20 In affirming the appellate court, the Supreme Court of Virginia also cited the Perry language that the Due Process Clause required preliminary judicial inquiry into the reliability of eyewitness identifications “procured under unnecessarily suggestive circumstances arranged by law enforcement.” Walker v. Commonwealth, 887 S.E.2d 544 , 550 (Va. 2023) (quoting Perry, 565 U.S. at 238 ), cert. denied, 144 S.Ct. 827 (2024).

2019As late as 2012, Justice Sotomayor's dissenting opinion in Perry v. New Hampshire , 565 U.S. 228 , 132 S.Ct. 716 , 181 L.Ed.2d 694 (2012), pointed out, "To date, Foster is the only case in which we have found a due process violation." 565 U.S. at 261 , 132 S.Ct. 716 .

2015The Court of Appeals has “consistently held that the purview of the long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction set by the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.” Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC, 388 Md. 1, 15 , 878 A.2d 567 (2005) (citing Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md. 653, 657 , 370 A.2d 551 (1977); Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 224 , 352 A.2d 818 (1976); Lamprecht v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 262 Md. 126, 130 , 277 A.2d 272 (1971)).

2015The Court of Appeals has “consistently held that the purview of the long-arm statute is coextensive with the limits of personal jurisdiction set by the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.” Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC, 388 Md. 1, 15 , 878 A.2d 567 (2005) (citing Mohamed v. Michael, 279 Md. 653, 657 , 370 A.2d 551 (1977); Geelhoed v. Jensen, 277 Md. 220, 224 , 352 A.2d 818 (1976); Lamprecht v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 262 Md. 126, 130 , 277 A.2d 272 (1971)).

1998Thus, as the lower court recognized: In assessing the merits of a due process claim by a public employee who has been disciplined, a court must determine “(a) whether the discipline imposed deprived [the employee] of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and (b) if so, whether the manner in which the discipline was imposed satisfied constitutionally mandated protections.” Garraghty[ v. Jordan], 830 F.2d [1295,] 1299[ (4th Cir.1987) ], citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

1998Thus, as the lower court recognized: In assessing the merits of a due process claim by a public employee who has been disciplined, a court must determine “(a) whether the discipline imposed deprived [the employee] of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and (b) if so, whether the manner in which the discipline was imposed satisfied constitutionally mandated protections.” Garraghty[ v. Jordan], 830 F.2d [1295,] 1299[ (4th Cir.1987) ], citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 , 92 S.Ct. 2701 , 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972).

2018To show a Due Process violation: "[A] defendant must show that the pre-indictment delay caused him actual, substantial prejudice and that the delay was the product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage." Clark v. State , 364 Md. 611 , 631, 774 A.2d 1136 (2001) (citing Marion , 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 and United States v. Lovasco , 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ).

2018To show a Due Process violation: "[A] defendant must show that the pre-indictment delay caused him actual, substantial prejudice and that the delay was the product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage." Clark v. State , 364 Md. 611 , 631, 774 A.2d 1136 (2001) (citing Marion , 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 and United States v. Lovasco , 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ).

2018To show a Due Process violation: "[A] defendant must show that the pre-indictment delay caused him actual, substantial prejudice and that the delay was the product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage." Clark v. State , 364 Md. 611 , 631, 774 A.2d 1136 (2001) (citing Marion , 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 and United States v. Lovasco , 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ).

2018To show a Due Process violation: "[A] defendant must show that the pre-indictment delay caused him actual, substantial prejudice and that the delay was the product of a deliberate act by the government designed to gain a tactical advantage." Clark v. State , 364 Md. 611 , 631, 774 A.2d 1136 (2001) (citing Marion , 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 and United States v. Lovasco , 431 U.S. 783 , 97 S.Ct. 2044 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) ).

2012In Bordenkircher, the Court explained: To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, see North Carolina v. Pearce [ 395 U.S. 711, 738 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) ] (opinion of Black, J.), and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is “patently unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 , 32-33 n. 20, 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973)).

2012In Bordenkircher, the Court explained: To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, see North Carolina v. Pearce [ 395 U.S. 711, 738 , 89 S.Ct. 2072 , 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) ] (opinion of Black, J.), and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is “patently unconstitutional.” Id. (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 , 32-33 n. 20, 93 S.Ct. 1977 , 36 L.Ed.2d 714 (1973)).

1987See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 328 U.S. 25, 27 , 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949) (determining that Fourth Amendment was applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, but only to the extent of protecting against intrusions that “are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 , 72 S.Ct. 205, 209-10 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952) (ruling that an illegal seizure of evidence could be sufficiently offensive to the concept of “ordered liberty” as to render the admission of that evidence a violation of the due process clause).

1987See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 328 U.S. 25, 27 , 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949) (determining that Fourth Amendment was applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, but only to the extent of protecting against intrusions that “are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 , 72 S.Ct. 205, 209-10 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952) (ruling that an illegal seizure of evidence could be sufficiently offensive to the concept of “ordered liberty” as to render the admission of that evidence a violation of the due process clause).