due process clause in Florida

2018See Madera v. State, 943 So. 2d 960, 962 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (finding due process violation where a CI made promises of an intimate relationship, including sexual relations, if defendant assisted her in obtaining drugs); Farley v. State, 848 So. 2d 393, 397-98 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (finding due process violation where taskforce illegally manufactured child pornography with intent to lure defendant into purchasing such material); Soohoo v. State, 737 So. 2d 1108, 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (finding a due process violation where an undercover agent offered defendant a consignment arrangement for the

2018See, e.g. , id. at 463 ("[T]he illegal manufacture of crack cocaine by law enforcement officials for use in a reverse-sting operation ... constitutes governmental misconduct which violates the due process clause of the Florida Constitution.").

2026In "the second stage, a constitutional inquiry is conducted to determine whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between the forum state and the defendant to satisfy the due process requirement that a nonresident defendant 'should reasonably anticipate being haled into court' in Florida." Id. (quoting Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. 1989)).

2026In "the second stage, a constitutional inquiry is conducted to determine whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between the forum state and the defendant to satisfy the due process requirement that a nonresident defendant 'should reasonably anticipate being haled into court' in Florida." Id. (quoting Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 499, 500 (Fla. 1989)).

2017See In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90-91 (Fla. 1980) (holding in a dependency case "that counsel is necessarily required under the due process clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions, in proceedings involving the permanent termination of parental rights to a child" and that "where permanent termination or child abuse charges might result, counsel must be appointed for . . . the natural married or divorced indigent parents of the child"); G.C. v. W.J., 917 So. 2d 998, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that "[a]lthough it is true that chapter 63, unlike chapter 39, does not expressly pr

2017See In re D.B., 385 So.2d 83, 90-91 (Fla. 1980) (holding in a dependency case “that counsel is necessarily required under the due process clause of the United States and Florida Constitutions, in proceedings involving the permanent termination of parental rights to a child” and that “where permanent termination or child abuse charges might result, counsel must be appointed for ... the natural married or divorced indigent parents of the child”); G.C. v. W.J., 917 So.2d 998, 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005) (holding that “Although it is true that chapter 63, unlike chapter 39, does not expressly provide

2018Moreover, “[w]hile a person facing civil contempt sanctions is not entitled to the full panoply of due process rights afforded to a person facing indirect criminal contempt charges, he or she is nonetheless entitled to a proceeding that meets the fundamental fairness 4 requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Bresch v. Henderson, 761 So. 2d 449, 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (citation omitted).

2016Moreover, “[w]hile a person facing civil contempt sanctions is not entitled to the full panoply of due process rights afforded to a person facing indirect criminal contempt charges, he or she is nonetheless entitled to a proceeding that meets the fundamental fairness requirements of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Bresch v. Henderson, 761 So.2d 449, 451 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (citation omitted).

2013Section 775.021 is a codification of the common law rule of lenity, the foundation of which is the due process requirement that “criminal statutes must say with some precision exactly what is prohibited.” Perkins, 576 So.2d at 1312 .

2013This principle “rests on the due process requirement that criminal statutes must say with some precision exactly what is prohibited.” Perkins v. State, 576 So.2d 1310, 1312 (Fla.1991).

2012See Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional”; rejecting Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which federal court held that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2004), “violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face”); Ortega v. State, 76 So.3d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); see also State v. Adkins, 71 So.3d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), review granted, 71 So.3d 117 (Fla.2011).

2012See Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional”; rejecting Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which federal court held that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2004), “violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face”); Ortega v. State, 76 So.3d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); see also State v. Adkins, 71 So.3d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), review granted, 71 So.3d 117 (Fla.2011).

2006The Callaway Court determined that the second prong of Witt was satisfied because the "imposition of consecutive habitual felony offender sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode could not withstand a due process analysis ... [and] ... the decision in Hale significantly impacts a defendant's constitutional liberty interests." Id. at 986 (citation omitted).

2006Applying the Witt test to the Iacovone decision, we held that Iacovone was constitutional in nature because "imposition of a hefty criminal sentence pursuant to a patently `irrational' sentencing scheme `could not withstand a due process analysis' of any sort." Id. at 348 (quoting Callaway, 658 So.2d at 986 ).

2019A court cannot "rely on conduct of which the defendant has actually been acquitted when imposing a sentence." Ortiz v. State, 264 So. 3d 1032, 1034 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019) (quoting Dinkines v. State, 122 So. 3d 477, 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)); see also Epprecht v. State, 488 So. 2d 129, 131 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) ("[I]t is fundamental that the due process clause prohibits a court from considering charges of which an -3- accused has been acquitted in passing sentence." (citing Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740 (1948))).

2015“Although an appellate court generally may not review a sentence that is within statutory limits under the Criminal Punishment Code, an exception exists, when the trial court considers constitutionally impermissible factors in imposing a sentence.” Nawaz, 28 So.3d at 124, 125 (reversing and remanding for resentencing where “comments by the trial judge could reasonably be construed to suggest that the trial judge based appellant’s sentence, at least in part, on his national origin”). “[I]t is fundamental that the due process clause prohibits a court from considering charges of which an accused

2012See Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional”; rejecting Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which federal court held that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2004), “violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face”); Ortega v. State, 76 So.3d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); see also State v. Adkins, 71 So.3d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), review granted, 71 So.3d 117 (Fla.2011).

2012See Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional”; rejecting Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which federal court held that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2004), “violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face”); Ortega v. State, 76 So.3d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); see also State v. Adkins, 71 So.3d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), review granted, 71 So.3d 117 (Fla.2011).

2012See Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional”; rejecting Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which federal court held that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2004), “violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face”); Ortega v. State, 76 So.3d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); see also State v. Adkins, 71 So.3d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), review granted, 71 So.3d 117 (Fla.2011).

2012See Little v. State, 77 So.3d 722, 722-23 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011) (holding that “section 893.13, as amended by section 893.101, Florida Statutes (2002), is constitutional”; rejecting Shelton v. Secretary, Department of Corrections, 802 F.Supp.2d 1289, 1308 (M.D.Fla.2011), in which federal court held that section 893.13, Florida Statutes (2004), “violates the due process clause and that the statute is unconstitutional on its face”); Ortega v. State, 76 So.3d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); see also State v. Adkins, 71 So.3d 184 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011), review granted, 71 So.3d 117 (Fla.2011).

2022These allegations support a prima facie case for specific jurisdiction pursuant to sections 48.193(1)(a)(1), 48.193(1)(a)(2), 48.193(1)(a)(4), and 48.193(1)(a)(9), Florida Statutes. 6 The test to determine whether the due process requirement is satisfied asks “whether the defendant’s conduct in connection with the forum state is ‘such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’” Venetian Salami, 554 So. 2d at 500 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 8 attach artwork located in Miami-Dade County, which may be applied toward the sati

2018Critical to the due process analysis is whether the nonresident's "conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286 , 297, 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

2005Co., 296 So.2d 9, 15 (Fla.1974) ("The test to be used in determining whether an act is violative of the due process clause is whether the statute bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary or oppressive.").

1998As the Lasky court observed, the test used to determine whether a statute is violative of the due process clause "is whether the statute bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary or oppressive." Id. at 15 .

2019In State v. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985), the Florida Supreme Court found that the police tactic of using a contingent fee arrangement for the testimony of an informant constituted a due process violation because it manufactured, rather than detected, crime.

2019In State v. Glosson, 462 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1985), the Florida Supreme Court found that the police tactic of using a contingent fee arrangement for the testimony of an informant constituted a due process violation because it manufactured, rather than detected, crime.

2014See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 481 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 ; Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 52 , 109 S.Ct. 333 ; Guzman, 868 So.2d at 509 ; see also State v. Farr, 558 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“Although the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment refers to witnesses and does not encompass physical evidence, federal decisions hold that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and fundamental fairness entitles a defendant access to relevant and material evidence which is necessary to his defense.”) (internal citations omitted).

2014See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 481 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 ; Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 52 , 109 S.Ct. 333 ; Guzman, 868 So.2d at 509 ; see also State v. Farr, 558 So.2d 437, 438 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (“Although the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment refers to witnesses and does not encompass physical evidence, federal decisions hold that the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and fundamental fairness entitles a defendant access to relevant and material evidence which is necessary to his defense.”) (internal citations omitted).

2007See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)(holding that "[s]o long as a commercial actor's efforts are `purposefully directed' toward residents of *858 another State, we have consistently rejected that an absence of physical contacts can defeat jurisdiction there [under the due process clause]"); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-96 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), ("`Foreseeability' of injury alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.").

2007See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)(holding that "[s]o long as a commercial actor's efforts are `purposefully directed' toward residents of *858 another State, we have consistently rejected that an absence of physical contacts can defeat jurisdiction there [under the due process clause]"); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-96 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), ("`Foreseeability' of injury alone has never been a sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.").

2019Under the test articulated in Rodgers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 531 (Fla. 1987), defense counsel’s failure to move for dismissal (based on the delay between the alleged commission of the crime and the defendant’s arrest), amounts to a due process violation.

2001In Rogers v. State, 511 So.2d 526, 531 (Fla.1987), this Court explained the procedure a defendant must follow when the defendant asserts a due process violation based on preindictment delay: When a defendant asserts a due process violation based on preindictment delay, he bears the initial burden of showing actual prejudice....

2010See State v. Lopez, 908 So.2d 484, 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) *941 (holding that “failure to properly supervise the confidential informant, standing alone, did not amount to a due process violation”); State v. Figuereo, 761 So.2d 1252, 1255 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (same).

2007In State v. Lopez, 908 So.2d 484, 485 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (citing State v. Figuereo, 761 So.2d 1252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000)), we agreed with the state “that the alleged failure to properly supervise the confidential informant, standing alone, did not amount to a due process violation and establish objective entrapment.” However, we did not detail the facts of the case in that opinion.

2018See Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 165, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ("[W]hile mental condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant's state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry."); *262 Thomas v. State , 456 So.2d 454 , 458 (Fla. 1984) ; see also Rigterink v. State , 193 So.3d 846 , 865 (Fla. 2016).

2018See Colorado v. Connelly , 479 U.S. 157 , 165, 107 S.Ct. 515 , 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) ("[W]hile mental condition is surely relevant to an individual's susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant's state of mind can never conclude the due process inquiry."); *262 Thomas v. State , 456 So.2d 454 , 458 (Fla. 1984) ; see also Rigterink v. State , 193 So.3d 846 , 865 (Fla. 2016).

2022Rather, this court recognized that “[t]he minimum contacts requirement of the due process clause does not prevent Florida from enforcing another state’s valid judgment against a judgment-debtor’s property located there, regardless of the lack of other minimum contacts by the judgment-debtor.” Tabet v. Tabet, 644 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 , 210 n.36 (1977)).

2013We do not agree ... that the provisions in that section for notice to the judgment debtor are insufficient to meet due process standards.”); see also Tabet v. Tabet, 644 So.2d 557, 559 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (“The minimum contacts requirement of the due process clause does not prevent Florida from enforcing another state’s valid judgment against a judgment-debtor’s property located here, regardless of the lack of other minimum contacts by the judgment-debtor.” (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 , 210 n. 36, 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977))).

1992In Hunter the Florida Supreme Court, subsequent to the enactment of section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987), reaffirmed the objective entrapment standard it adopted in Cruz v. State, 465 So.2d 516 (Fla.), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 905 , 105 S.Ct. 3527 , 87 L.Ed.2d 652 (1985), thereby implicitly invalidating the statute pursuant to the due process clause of the Florida Constitution.

1992See also House of Representatives Committee on Criminal Justice Staff Analysis, June 27, 1989), at 177 ("This section overrules the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Cruz v. State, 465 So.2d 516 (Fla. 1985), which held that the objective test of whether law enforcement conduct was impermissible was in the discretion of the trial court'). [footnote omitted] Gonzalez, 571 So.2d at 1349 . [5] The entire passage is as follows: While the objective view parallels a due process analysis, it is not founded on constitutional principles.