due process clause in Delaware

2026For example, the long-arm statute is to be “broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the Due Process Clause.” Hercules, 611 A.2d at 480 ; accord LaNuova D & B, S.p.A v. Bowe Co., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986). “[T]rial courts must give a broad reading to the terms of the long-arm statute[ ] in order to effectuate the statute's intent to ensure that this state's court may exercise jurisdiction to the full limits permissible under the Due Process Clause … and rely upon a Due Process analysis to screen out uses of the statute that sweep too broadly.” Sample v.

2026For example, the long-arm statute is to be “broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the Due Process Clause.” Hercules, 611 A.2d at 480 ; accord LaNuova D & B, S.p.A v. Bowe Co., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986). “[T]rial courts must give a broad reading to the terms of the long-arm statute[ ] in order to effectuate the statute's intent to ensure that this state's court may exercise jurisdiction to the full limits permissible under the Due Process Clause … and rely upon a Due Process analysis to screen out uses of the statute that sweep too broadly.” Sample v.

2024Constitutional Due Process Even though the long arm statute is satisfied, constitutional requirements of the due process clause must be met.79 The long-established due process test for personal jurisdiction requires “sufficient minimum contacts between the defendant and Delaware such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”80 Neither Devon nor Cheryl seriously engaged with the constitutional element of personal jurisdiction.81 If Cheryl came to Delaware to unduly influence a 76 Id. at 13 (citing TAP ¶ 39). 77 Harris

2024Ct.). 5 Id. 6 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Boone, 724 at 1158. 7 Ryan v. Gifford, 935 A.2d 258, 265 (Del.Ch.2007). 5 considered amenable to the jurisdiction of Delaware courts.8 The statute is “broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the due process clause.”9 Plaintiff Taylor argues that its claim against Mazda Motor Corporation, a nonresident, is based on Mazda Motor Corporation’s various acts of designing, creating, controlling, advertising, and employing a distribution system for the sale of motor vehicles in Delaware

2026For example, the long-arm statute is to be “broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the Due Process Clause.” Hercules, 611 A.2d at 480 ; accord LaNuova D & B, S.p.A v. Bowe Co., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986). “[T]rial courts must give a broad reading to the terms of the long-arm statute[ ] in order to effectuate the statute's intent to ensure that this state's court may exercise jurisdiction to the full limits permissible under the Due Process Clause … and rely upon a Due Process analysis to screen out uses of the statute that sweep too broadly.” Sample v.

2026For example, the long-arm statute is to be “broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the Due Process Clause.” Hercules, 611 A.2d at 480 ; accord LaNuova D & B, S.p.A v. Bowe Co., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986). “[T]rial courts must give a broad reading to the terms of the long-arm statute[ ] in order to effectuate the statute's intent to ensure that this state's court may exercise jurisdiction to the full limits permissible under the Due Process Clause … and rely upon a Due Process analysis to screen out uses of the statute that sweep too broadly.” Sample v.

2021Finally, Delaware courts have consistently held that our long-arm statute is to 4 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-298 (1980). 5 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). 6 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 7 be construed broadly to confer personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the due process clause.7 ANALYSIS Standard of Review Pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(2), Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that I have personal jurisdiction ove

2016This Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant under Section 35 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 (1985). 36 Hercules Inc. v. Leu Trust & Banking Ltd., 611 A.2d 476, 480 (Del. 1992) (citing LaNuova D & B, S.p.A., 513 A.2d at 768 (“[S]ection 3104(c) has been broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the due process clause.”)). 10 3104(c)(3) “if the plaintiff demonstrates that the non-resident defendant has caused a tortious injury in Delaware and such injury was due to an act or omission by the defendant in Delawa

2026For example, the long-arm statute is to be “broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the Due Process Clause.” Hercules, 611 A.2d at 480 ; accord LaNuova D & B, S.p.A v. Bowe Co., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986). “[T]rial courts must give a broad reading to the terms of the long-arm statute[ ] in order to effectuate the statute's intent to ensure that this state's court may exercise jurisdiction to the full limits permissible under the Due Process Clause … and rely upon a Due Process analysis to screen out uses of the statute that sweep too broadly.” Sample v.

2026For example, the long-arm statute is to be “broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the Due Process Clause.” Hercules, 611 A.2d at 480 ; accord LaNuova D & B, S.p.A v. Bowe Co., 513 A.2d 764, 768 (Del. 1986). “[T]rial courts must give a broad reading to the terms of the long-arm statute[ ] in order to effectuate the statute's intent to ensure that this state's court may exercise jurisdiction to the full limits permissible under the Due Process Clause … and rely upon a Due Process analysis to screen out uses of the statute that sweep too broadly.” Sample v.

2019For purposes of the due process analysis, “[t]he well-established point of departure is that certain minimum contacts must exist between a State and a nonresident defendant before that State can exercise personal jurisdiction over him.” Moore v. Little Giant Indus., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1043, 1048 (D.

2017In other words, the Supreme Court has instructed that trial courts should permit service under § 3104 if the statutory language plausibly permits service, and rely upon a Due Process analysis to screen out uses of the statute that sweep too broadly.” (footnote omitted)). 98 Moore v. Little Giant Indus., Inc., 513 F. Supp. 1043, 1048 (D.

2019“That a confrontation is suggestive, without more, however, cannot amount to a due process violation; the unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure must also carry with it the increased danger of an irreparable misidentification.” Younger, 496 A.2d at 550 (c_iting Mansr)n v. Bralhwai/e, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Bigger.s', 409 U.S. 188 (1972)).

2016See id. at 724 (“Even when the police use such a procedure, ... suppression of the re-suiting identification is not the inevitable consequence.” (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977))); Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546, 550 (Del.1985) ("That a confrontation is suggestive, without more, ... cannot amount to a due process violation; the unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure must also carry with it the increased danger of an irreparable misidentification.”); see also Monroe v. State, 28 A.3d 418, 432-35 (Del.2011). 9 .

2019“That a confrontation is suggestive, without more, however, cannot amount to a due process violation; the unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure must also carry with it the increased danger of an irreparable misidentification.” Younger, 496 A.2d at 550 (c_iting Mansr)n v. Bralhwai/e, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Neil v. Bigger.s', 409 U.S. 188 (1972)).

2016See id. at 724 (“Even when the police use such a procedure, ... suppression of the re-suiting identification is not the inevitable consequence.” (citing Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 , 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977))); Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546, 550 (Del.1985) ("That a confrontation is suggestive, without more, ... cannot amount to a due process violation; the unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure must also carry with it the increased danger of an irreparable misidentification.”); see also Monroe v. State, 28 A.3d 418, 432-35 (Del.2011). 9 .

2025Dist., 315 Neb. 596 , 609–10, 615 (2023)); see also Opening Br. at 26. 51 552 A.2d 466 (Del. 1989). violations” of the statute in question while “simultaneously discharging . . . administrative responsibilities.”52 The Blinder Court held that commingling prosecutorial and adjudicative roles is not a due process violation unless there is a showing “sufficient to overcome the strong presumption” that adjudicators act honestly and with integrity, “in the absence of specific evidence of bias.”53 Here, the Court finds that the record does not indicate that Ms. Sweeney’s role in the case is sufficie

2014Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1259 (Del.2011) (citing Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc. v. Bruton, 552 A.2d 466, 472 (Del.1989)); see also Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1070 (Del.2001) (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 246 A.2d 90, 92 (Del.1968) (noting that the due process clause of the Delaware Constitution has "substantially the same meaning" as the due process clause in its federal counterpart.)); but see Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 85-87 (Del.1990) (citing Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744 (Del.1983) (holding that, in cases involving the State’s obligation to preserve evidence, the due pr

2024Ct. June 1, 2021) (citations omitted). 40 AeroGlobal Capital Management, LLC v. Cirrus Industries, Inc., 871 A.2d 428, 437 (Del. 2005). 6 may consider the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery of record.”41 Normally, the Court applies a two-pronged analysis, first considering whether Delaware's Long Arm Statute is applicable, and then determining whether subjecting the nonresident defendant to jurisdiction in Delaware violates the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 Thus, if Allstate challenged this Court’s jurisdiction over it in a timely manner, Mason would have been tasked with

2022On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Superior Court Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction over a defendant, “A plaintiff bears the burden of showing a basis for a trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.”14 “In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the Court may consider the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery of record.”15 Normally, the Court applies a two- pronged analysis, first considering whether Delaware’s Long Arm Statute is applicable, and then determining whether subjecting the nonresident defendant to jurisdiction in Delaware violates the Due Process

2019Supr., 246 A.2d 90 , 92 (1968) ); see also Cohen v. State , 89 A.3d 65 , 86 (Del. 2014) ("Delaware constitutional due process is coextensive with federal constitutional due process."); Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. Bruton , 552 A.2d 466 , 472 (Del. 1989) (finding the due process right under the Delaware Constitution to be coextensive with the Sixth Amendment).

2014Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1259 (Del.2011) (citing Blinder, Robinson & Co., Inc. v. Bruton, 552 A.2d 466, 472 (Del.1989)); see also Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1070 (Del.2001) (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 246 A.2d 90, 92 (Del.1968) (noting that the due process clause of the Delaware Constitution has "substantially the same meaning" as the due process clause in its federal counterpart.)); but see Hammond v. State, 569 A.2d 81, 85-87 (Del.1990) (citing Deberry v. State, 457 A.2d 744 (Del.1983) (holding that, in cases involving the State’s obligation to preserve evidence, the due pr

2018DISCUSSION Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that “closing argument is an aspect of a fair trial which is implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by which the States are bound.”44 lt is well established that a prosecutor may not misrepresent the evidence presented at trial,45 is allowed to explain legitimate inferences that can be drawn from the evidence, and is not confined to repeat the evidence that was presented at trial.46 His role is not only to convict the guilty, but also to protect the rights of the accused and to seek justice.47 42 Spence I, 2014 WL 2089506 ,

1987In Bailey , we restated our holding in Hooks that “closing argument is an aspect of a fair trial which is implicit in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by which the States are bound.” Id. at 1003. *861 Reported decisions of this Court following Sexton, Hooks and Hughes are disturbing not only because our admonitions have gone unheeded but because the same types of error have been repeated as an examination of several reported decisions by this Court shows.

2019Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247 , 1259 (Del. 2011) ("Delaware constitutional due process is coextensive with federal due process."); Helman v. State , 784 A.2d 1058 , 1070 (Del. 2001) ("This Court has previously determined that the due process clause of the Delaware Constitution has 'substantially the same meaning' as the due process clause contained in its federal counterpart.") (citing Opinion of the Justices, Del.

2019Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1259 (Del. 2011) (“Delaware constitutional due process is coextensive with federal due process.”); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1070 (Del. 2001) (“This Court has previously determined that the due process clause of the Delaware Constitution has ‘substantially the same meaning’ as the due process clause contained in its federal counterpart.”) (citing Opinion of the Justices, Del.

2019Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247 , 1259 (Del. 2011) ("Delaware constitutional due process is coextensive with federal due process."); Helman v. State , 784 A.2d 1058 , 1070 (Del. 2001) ("This Court has previously determined that the due process clause of the Delaware Constitution has 'substantially the same meaning' as the due process clause contained in its federal counterpart.") (citing Opinion of the Justices, Del.

2019Francis de Sales, 15 A.3d 1247, 1259 (Del. 2011) (“Delaware constitutional due process is coextensive with federal due process.”); Helman v. State, 784 A.2d 1058, 1070 (Del. 2001) (“This Court has previously determined that the due process clause of the Delaware Constitution has ‘substantially the same meaning’ as the due process clause contained in its federal counterpart.”) (citing Opinion of the Justices, Del.

2025Brady teaches the State’s failure to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence that is favorable to an accused and is material to the case violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.83 A violation may exist irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.84 To comply with Brady, a prosecutor must “disclose all relevant information obtained by the police or others in the Attorney General's Office to the defense.”85 There are three components of a Brady violation: “(1) evidence exists that is favorable to the accused because it is eithe

2017A. Brady v. Marylaml The primary argument presented in these motions is that the State failed to disclose the ongoing misconduct at the OCME to the defendants at the time their cases were pending and such failure violated their rights under Brocly v. Marylcma'. 1n Broo’y v. Morylancl, the United States Supreme Court held that the State's failure 26 Mot. to Estop the State from Arguing in Resp. to Pet’rs’ OCME Post-Conviction l\/lots that Because Pet’rs Admitted to Committing a Drug Offense Their Guilty Pleas Cannot be Vacated (“Estoppel Supp.”) at 2. 14 to disclose evidence favorable to an acc

2023June 23, 1986). 50 Boone v. Oy Partek Ab, 724 A.2d 1150, 1154 (Del.

2022Delaware's long-arm statute lists six circumstances under which any nonresident or personal representative thereof, who in person or through an agent, is considered amenable to the jurisdiction of Delaware courts.6 The statute is “broadly construed to confer jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the due process clause.”7 Ms. Oliver alleges a legal malpractice claim against Mr. Galerman based on representation which 2 Id. at 1155 ; Aeroglobal Capital Management, LLC v. Cirrus Indus., Inc., 2003 WL 77007 , *3 (Del.Super.). 3 Hartsel v. Vanguard Group, Inc., 2011 WL 2421003 , *7 (Del.

2025See also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014) (“A Brady violation occurs where the State fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, causing prejudice to the defendant.”). 84 Wright, 91 A.3d 972 at 987. 85 See Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 333 (Del. 2015) (quoting Wright, 91 A.3d at 987– 88). 86 See Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164 , 1169 n.24 (quoting Liu v. State, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014) (TABLE)).

2017See also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014) (“A Brady violation occurs where the State fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, causing prejudice to the defendant.”). 28 See Slarling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 333 (Del. 2015), reargument denied (Jan. 14, 2016) 29See Canrzon, 127 A.3d at 1169 n 24 (quoting Liu v. State, 103 A.3d 515 (Del.2014) (Table)); State v. Wright, 67 A.3d 319, 324 (Del. 2013), as amended (l\/lay 28, 2013).

2025See also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014) (“A Brady violation occurs where the State fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, causing prejudice to the defendant.”). 84 Wright, 91 A.3d 972 at 987. 85 See Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 333 (Del. 2015) (quoting Wright, 91 A.3d at 987– 88). 86 See Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164 , 1169 n.24 (quoting Liu v. State, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014) (TABLE)).

2025See also Wright v. State, 91 A.3d 972, 977 (Del. 2014) (“A Brady violation occurs where the State fails to disclose material evidence that is favorable to the accused, because it is either exculpatory or impeaching, causing prejudice to the defendant.”). 84 Wright, 91 A.3d 972 at 987. 85 See Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 333 (Del. 2015) (quoting Wright, 91 A.3d at 987– 88). 86 See Cannon v. State, 127 A.3d 1164 , 1169 n.24 (quoting Liu v. State, 103 A.3d 515 (Del. 2014) (TABLE)).

2021Accordingly, the due process clause is not a basis to deny Defendants’ motions. 30 AmeriSource Corp. v. U.S., 525 F.3d 1149, 1154 (Fed.

2021Accordingly, the due process clause is not a basis to deny Defendants’ motions. 30 AmeriSource Corp. v. U.S., 525 F.3d 1149, 1154 (Fed.

2021Cir. 2008) (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. at 453 ). 31 AmeriSource Corp., 525 F.3d at 1154 . 32 Acadia Tech., Inc., 458 F.3d at 1333 -34 (citing U.S. v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. 555, 564-67 (1983)). 33 United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. at 564-67 ; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). 8 C.

2021Cir. 2008) (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. at 453 ). 31 AmeriSource Corp., 525 F.3d at 1154 . 32 Acadia Tech., Inc., 458 F.3d at 1333 -34 (citing U.S. v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. 555, 564-67 (1983)). 33 United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. at 564-67 ; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). 8 C.

2021Cir. 2008) (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. at 453 ). 31 AmeriSource Corp., 525 F.3d at 1154 . 32 Acadia Tech., Inc., 458 F.3d at 1333 -34 (citing U.S. v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. 555, 564-67 (1983)). 33 United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. at 564-67 ; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). 8 C.

2021Cir. 2008) (citing Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. at 453 ). 31 AmeriSource Corp., 525 F.3d at 1154 . 32 Acadia Tech., Inc., 458 F.3d at 1333 -34 (citing U.S. v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. 555, 564-67 (1983)). 33 United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred & Fifty Dollars, 461 U.S. at 564-67 ; Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972). 8 C.

2025In determining a due process challenge, the Court must weigh the “Eldridge factors” set out by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge. 34 Under Eldridge the Court must examine: 33F 1. the private interest that will be affected by the official action; 2. the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; 31 D.I. 27. 32 Id. 33 D.I. 28. 34 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). 3. and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the

1984The Court then stated that the due process factors to be weighed against that presumption derive from the case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 , 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), which sets forth three elements to be evaluated in deciding what due process requires in a case in which physical liberty is not endangered: “the private interests at stake, the government’s interest, and the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous decisions.” 452 U.S. at 27 , 101 S.Ct. at 2159 .

2025Oct. 27, 2016) (TABLE) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 753–54 (1982)). 26 Id. (citing Orville v. Div. of Fam.

2025Oct. 27, 2016) (TABLE) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 , 753–54 (1982)). 26 Id. (citing Orville v. Div. of Fam.

2021Finally, Delaware courts have consistently held that our long-arm statute is to 4 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297-298 (1980). 5 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985). 6 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cty., 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 7 be construed broadly to confer personal jurisdiction to the maximum extent possible under the due process clause.7 ANALYSIS Standard of Review Pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Civil Rule 12(b)(2), Plaintiffs bear the burden of establishing that I have personal jurisdiction ove

1997World-Wide Volkswagen, Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 , 100 S.Ct. 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Asahi Metal Industry Co. Ltd. v. Super.