due process clause in Arizona

2023Id. ¶14 Citing Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462 (App. 2014), Linda argues that by receiving evidence at the August 16, 2022 hearing, the court “deprived [her] of a meaningful opportunity to present her evidence and test the veracity of Zia’s claims.” Volk, however, addressed the due process requirement that a court “afford the parties an opportunity to present sworn oral testimony.” 235 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 1.

2023Id. ¶14 Citing Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462 (App. 2014), Linda argues that by receiving evidence at the August 16, 2022 hearing, the court “deprived [her] of a meaningful opportunity to present her evidence and test the veracity of Zia’s claims.” Volk, however, addressed the due process requirement that a court “afford the parties an opportunity to present sworn oral testimony.” 235 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 1.

2024See Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 507 ; Dunlap, 187 Ariz. at 452–53; State v. O’Dell, 202 Ariz. 453, 458, ¶ 13 (App. 2002) (“The mere possibility that destroyed evidence could have exculpated a defendant is insufficient to establish a due process violation, as there has been no showing of prejudice to the defendant.”).

2023Courts consistently hold that diminished recollection by witnesses does not, by itself, constitute the type of substantial prejudice warranting a finding of a due process violation.”); Wills, 177 Ariz. at 594-95; State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441, 451 (App. 1996); see also State v. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. 502, 507 (1993) (The mere possibility of prejudice is insufficient.).

2010Based upon the circumstances, the court did not abuse its broad discretion in holding Plaintiff to the agreed-upon schedule. ¶ 17 Additionally, to merit reversal, a party “must show they incurred some harm as a result of [a] court’s time limitations.” Brown, 194 Ariz. at 91, ¶ 30 , 977 P.2d at 813 ; see also State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441, 450 , 930 P.2d 518, 527 (App.1996) (holding that “proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for ... the prejudice” (quoting United States v. Lovas

2010Based upon the circumstances, the court did not abuse its broad discretion in holding Plaintiff to the agreed-upon schedule. ¶ 17 Additionally, to merit reversal, a party “must show they incurred some harm as a result of [a] court’s time limitations.” Brown, 194 Ariz. at 91, ¶ 30 , 977 P.2d at 813 ; see also State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441, 450 , 930 P.2d 518, 527 (App.1996) (holding that “proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for ... the prejudice” (quoting United States v. Lovas

2024See Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 507 ; Dunlap, 187 Ariz. at 452–53; State v. O’Dell, 202 Ariz. 453, 458, ¶ 13 (App. 2002) (“The mere possibility that destroyed evidence could have exculpated a defendant is insufficient to establish a due process violation, as there has been no showing of prejudice to the defendant.”).

2023Courts consistently hold that diminished recollection by witnesses does not, by itself, constitute the type of substantial prejudice warranting a finding of a due process violation.”); Wills, 177 Ariz. at 594-95; State v. Dunlap, 187 Ariz. 441, 451 (App. 1996); see also State v. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. 502, 507 (1993) (The mere possibility of prejudice is insufficient.).

2014In assessing materiality in that context, Trombetta stated “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” 467 U.S. at 489 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 . ¶ 18 The Trombetta standard, grounded in the due process clause, is inapposite for assessing the appropriateness of a Willits instruction, which, as discussed, does not turn on the subjective intent of the state’s agents.

2014In assessing materiality in that context, Trombetta stated “evidence must both possess an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” 467 U.S. at 489 , 104 S.Ct. 2528 . ¶ 18 The Trombetta standard, grounded in the due process clause, is inapposite for assessing the appropriateness of a Willits instruction, which, as discussed, does not turn on the subjective intent of the state’s agents.

2005Application of the proper standard of proof in a termination hearing is a critical component of the “fundamentally fair procedures” necessary to satisfy due process. ¶ 25 As the Supreme Court has noted, “the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.” Id. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)).

2005Application of the proper standard of proof in a termination hearing is a critical component of the “fundamentally fair procedures” necessary to satisfy due process. ¶ 25 As the Supreme Court has noted, “the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.” Id. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 , 99 S.Ct. 1804 , 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)).

2020See State v. Broughton, 156 Ariz. 394, 397 (1988) (finding the due process clause has a “limited” role in the case of pre- indictment delays as such matters are protected primarily by statutes of limitations).

2020In Broughton, our supreme court explained that to establish a due process violation based on pre-indictment delay, “there must be a showing that the prosecution intentionally delayed proceedings to gain a tactical advantage over the defendant or to harass him, and that the 4 STATE v. RODRIGUEZ Decision of the Court defendant has actually been prejudiced by the delay.” Id.

2021The Court disagreed, reasoning that “[t]he fallibility of eyewitness evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to assess its creditworthiness.” Id. at 245 (emphasis added).

2016But “the due process clause does not preclude every identification that is arguably unreliable; it precludes identification testimony procured by the state through unduly suggestive pretrial procedures.” State v. Williams, 166 Ariz. 132, 137 , 800 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1987); accord Perry v. New Hampshire, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 716, 726 , 181 L.Ed.2d 694 (2012) (“The due process check for reliability ... comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper police conduct.”). ¶ 131 To establish that admission of identification testimony violated due process, a defendant must first show that t

2009Youngblood held that “[t]he presence or absence of bad faith for purposes of the due process clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.” 488 U.S. at 56 n*, 109 S.Ct. 333 .

2009Youngblood held that “[t]he presence or absence of bad faith for purposes of the due process clause must necessarily turn on the police’s knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed.” 488 U.S. at 56 n*, 109 S.Ct. 333 .

2017However, the Court cautioned, “[t]hat the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation, does not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in *232 the case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high.” Id. ¶ 20 Here, the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions not just in a single agency but in the same official presents “special facts and circumstances” creating an intolerable risk of unfairness.

2005When confronted with the dual roles held by an administrative fact-finder in an analogous situation, the United States Supreme Court held in Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 58 , 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1470 , 43 L.Ed.2d 712, 730 (1975), that “the *434 combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation” by creating an unconstitutional risk of bias.

2016But “the due process clause does not preclude every identification that is arguably unreliable; it precludes identification testimony procured by the state through unduly suggestive pretrial procedures.” State v. Williams, 166 Ariz. 132, 137 , 800 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1987); accord Perry v. New Hampshire, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 716, 726 , 181 L.Ed.2d 694 (2012) (“The due process check for reliability ... comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper police conduct.”). ¶ 131 To establish that admission of identification testimony violated due process, a defendant must first show that t

2016But “the due process clause does not preclude every identification that is arguably unreliable; it precludes identification testimony procured by the state through unduly suggestive pretrial procedures.” State v. Williams, 166 Ariz. 132, 137 , 800 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1987); accord Perry v. New Hampshire, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 716, 726 , 181 L.Ed.2d 694 (2012) (“The due process check for reliability ... comes into play only after the defendant establishes improper police conduct.”). ¶ 131 To establish that admission of identification testimony violated due process, a defendant must first show that t

2024See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 171 (1991) (“The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not permit the state to deprive a person of liberty for violating a statute whose terms are so vague, indefinite and uncertain that their meaning cannot be reasonably ascertained.”) (cleaned up).

2022See State v. Western, 168 Ariz. 169, 171 (1991) (“The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not permit the state to deprive a person of liberty for violating a statute whose terms are so vague, indefinite and uncertain that their meaning cannot be reasonably ascertained.”) (citation omitted). ¶15 We review de novo whether a statute passes constitutional muster.

2024See Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 507 ; Dunlap, 187 Ariz. at 452–53; State v. O’Dell, 202 Ariz. 453, 458, ¶ 13 (App. 2002) (“The mere possibility that destroyed evidence could have exculpated a defendant is insufficient to establish a due process violation, as there has been no showing of prejudice to the defendant.”).

2010“The mere possibility that destroyed evidence could have exculpated a defendant is insufficient to establish a due process violation.” State v. O’Dell, 202 Ariz. 453 , 458 ¶ 13, 46 P.3d 1074, 1079 (App.2002). 5 *98 The detectives understood what evidence they were required to preserve, and nothing suggests that they failed to preserve tapes of the relevant calls.

2020Id. ¶11 In resolving a due process challenge, courts must consider: (1) the private interests affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 4 GRAND HOLDINGS, et al. v. PEORIA Decision of the Court State ex rel.

2018The process due in a particular case depends on three factors: "[f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." Mathews , 424 U.S. at 334 -35 , 96 S.Ct. 893 . ¶ 11 The Department and pro bono counsel do not dispu

1981This question was left open in Fisher v. United States, supra, 425 U.S. at 414 , 96 S.Ct. at 1582 , the Court saying: “Whether the Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not his ‘private papers,’ * * The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 , 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), provides in its relevant part: “No person * * * shall be compelled i

1981This question was left open in Fisher v. United States, supra, 425 U.S. at 414 , 96 S.Ct. at 1582 , the Court saying: “Whether the Fifth Amendment would shield the taxpayer from producing his own tax records in his possession is a question not involved here; for the papers demanded here are not his ‘private papers,’ * * The Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 , 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1492 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), provides in its relevant part: “No person * * * shall be compelled i

2025In clarifying the potential and putative father classifications, we emphasize that “[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,’ his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (second alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).

2016The Court reasoned, “[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘eom[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,’ his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause.” Id., quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 , 99 S.Ct. 1760 (second alteration in Lehr) (citation omitted).

2019See Jackson, 390 U.S. at 581 ; see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.”); Stockwell, 472 F.2d at 1187 .

1997“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort, and for an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person’s reliance on his legal rights is ‘patently unconstitutional.’ ” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 , 98 S.Ct. 663, 668 , 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978) (citations omitted).

2025In clarifying the potential and putative father classifications, we emphasize that “[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,’ his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (second alteration in original) (internal citation omitted) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979)).

2016The Court reasoned, “[w]hen an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by ‘eom[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,’ his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the due process clause.” Id., quoting Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 , 99 S.Ct. 1760 (second alteration in Lehr) (citation omitted).

2023Id. ¶14 Citing Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462 (App. 2014), Linda argues that by receiving evidence at the August 16, 2022 hearing, the court “deprived [her] of a meaningful opportunity to present her evidence and test the veracity of Zia’s claims.” Volk, however, addressed the due process requirement that a court “afford the parties an opportunity to present sworn oral testimony.” 235 Ariz. at 463 ¶ 1.

2023We review due process challenges de novo, Backstrand v. Backstrand, 250 Ariz. 339, 346, ¶ 28 (App. 2020), and will reverse a decision for a due process violation only if the error prejudices a party, Volk v. Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 470, ¶ 26 (App. 2014). ¶8 Due process requires the court to allow litigants to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Backstrand, 250 Ariz. at 346, ¶ 29 (citation omitted).