316 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1926–2026 59 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wagnergreen2 sentences2015It must be established by plain, unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)). 12 The statutory text in context is conclusive: ORS 183.413 does not confer an entitlement to subpoena witnesses in parole consideration hearings. 13 Finally, petitioner argues that the board violated his “due process” rights under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution 14 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 15 We summarily reject petitioner’s state constitutional argument: It is axiomatic that Article I, section 10, “is not a 2015It must be established by plain, unavoidable, and irreconcilable repugnancy.” (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.)). 12 The statutory text in context is conclusive: ORS 183.413 does not confer an entitlement to subpoena witnesses in parole consideration hearings. 13 Finally, petitioner argues that the board violated his “due process” rights under Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution 14 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 15 We summarily reject petitioner’s state constitutional argument: It is axiomatic that Article I, section 10, “is not a | 4 | 6 |
State v. Zinsligreen2 sentences2022See State v. Zinsli, 156 Or App 245, 251 , 966 P2d 1200 (1998) (explaining that, to determine “whether evidence is material and favorable, the compulsory process analysis is identical to the due process analysis”). 2022See State v. Zinsli, 156 Or App 245, 251 , 966 P2d 1200 (1998) (explaining that, to determine “whether evidence is material and favorable, the compulsory process analysis is identical to the due process analysis”). | 3 | 6 |
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen2 sentences2017Pearce, 395 US at 724 (quoting Jackson, 390 US at 581 ); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357, 363 , 98 S Ct 663 , 54 L Ed 2d 604 (1978) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.”). 2017Pearce, 395 US at 724 (quoting Jackson, 390 US at 581 ); see also Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 US 357, 363 , 98 S Ct 663 , 54 L Ed 2d 604 (1978) (“To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation of the most basic sort.”). | 3 | 5 |
United States v. Lovascogreen2 sentences2022See Lovasco, 431 US at 789 (“[P]roof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, * * * the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.”). 2022See Lovasco, 431 US at 789 (“[P]roof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, * * * the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.”). | 3 | 4 |
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. Department of Revenuegreen2 sentences2025See Southern Pacific, 302 Or at 588 (“The limits imposed by the commerce clause and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment are much alike.”); PacifiCorp v. Dept. of Rev., __ OTR __ (Jul 17, 2023) (slip op at 82-90) (appeal pending) (applying Southern Pacific to test allocation of property value to Oregon); see also Hellerstein et al., State Taxation at Intro Pt III (Jul 2024) (“There is frequently an overlap between the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause as applied to state taxation of interstate or foreign commerce, since extraterritorial taxation may also impose an undue 2025See Southern Pacific, 302 Or at 588 (“The limits imposed by the commerce clause and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment are much alike.”); PacifiCorp v. Dept. of Rev., __ OTR __ (Jul 17, 2023) (slip op at 82-90) (appeal pending) (applying Southern Pacific to test allocation of property value to Oregon); see also Hellerstein et al., State Taxation at Intro Pt III (Jul 2024) (“There is frequently an overlap between the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause as applied to state taxation of interstate or foreign commerce, since extraterritorial taxation may also impose an 54 Pla | 3 | 3 |
| Richardson v. Texasgreen | 3 | 3 |
State Ex Rel. Jones v. Crookhamgreen2 sentences2013See State ex rel Jones v. Crookham, 296 Or 735, 742 , 681 P2d 103 (1984) (Linde, J., concurring) (noting that, because Oregon does not have a due process clause, the limit of due process under ORCP 4 L is “an issue of federal law to be decided pursuant to the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court”). 2013See State ex rel Jones v. Crookham, 296 Or 735, 742 , 681 P2d 103 (1984) (Linde, J., concurring) (noting that, because Oregon does not have a due process clause, the limit of due process under ORCP 4 L is “an issue of federal law to be decided pursuant to the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court”). | 2 | 6 |
Pennsylvania v. Ritchiegreen2 sentences2021The United States Supreme Court so decided, as to the Sixth Amendment, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 US 39, 56 , 107 S Ct 989 , 94 L Ed 2d 40 (1987), and we concurred, as to Article I, section 11, in State v. Zinsli, 156 Or App 245, 252 , 966 P2d 1200 , rev den, 328 Or 194 (1998) (compulsory process review “is absorbed into the due process analysis” of the Fourteenth Amendment). 2021The United States Supreme Court so decided, as to the Sixth Amendment, in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 US 39, 56 , 107 S Ct 989 , 94 L Ed 2d 40 (1987), and we concurred, as to Article I, section 11, in State v. Zinsli, 156 Or App 245, 252 , 966 P2d 1200 , rev den, 328 Or 194 (1998) (compulsory process review “is absorbed into the due process analysis” of the Fourteenth Amendment). | 2 | 4 |
State Ex Rel. Juvenile Department v. Geistgreen2 sentences2016See Geist, 310 Or at 190 (the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings is “fundamental fairness,” which includes fact-finding procedures, such as “notice, [ ] counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and standards of proof”).12 The question that remains is the one on which the Court of Appeals divided and the only one on which the par- ties disagree on review: Whether this court’s reasons for pro- viding a direct appeal remedy in Geist have been obviated by the enactment in 2001 of ORS 419B.923.13 In overview, that statute provides that, “on motion and such notice and hear- 12 2016See Geist, 310 Or at 190 (the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings is “fundamental fairness,” which includes fact-finding procedures, such as “notice, [] counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and standards of proof’). 12 The question that remains is the one on which the Court of Appeals divided and the only one on which the parties disagree on review: Whether this court’s reasons for providing a direct appeal remedy in Geist have been obviated by the enactment in 2001 of ORS 419B.923. 13 In overview, that statute provides that, “on motion and such notice and hear *695 i | 2 | 4 |
Arizona v. Youngbloodgreen2 sentences2024Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58 , 109 S Ct 333 , 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988). 2024Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 US 51, 58 , 109 S Ct 333 , 102 L Ed 2d 281 (1988). | 2 | 3 |
Deck v. Missourigreen2 sentences2023If such findings are not made, or where the order lacks adequate justification, “the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation”—instead, “the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Deck, 544 US at 635 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Washington, 355 Or at 629 (reviewing similar security measure orders for abuse of discretion). 2023If such findings are not made, or where the order lacks adequate justification, “the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation”—instead, “the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the shackling error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” Deck, 544 US at 635 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Washington, 355 Or at 629 (reviewing similar security measure orders for abuse of discretion). | 2 | 3 |
| Koskela v. Willamette Industries, Inc.green | 2 | 3 |
| Glossip v. Oklahoma Revisions: 2/25/25green | 2 | 2 |
| Ungar v. Sarafitegreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Garzagreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Bensongreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Johansengreen | 2 | 2 |
| Ludwig v. United Statesgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Brown v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Parker v. Time Warner Entertainment Co.green | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Washingtongreen | 2 | 2 |
International Shoe Co. v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2017The Court explained that “more realistically it may be said that those authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify the fiction.” Id. 7 The Court thus shifted the federal constitutional basis for exercising jurisdiction over foreign corporations away from conclusory terms like “presence” and legal fictions like “implied consent” and grounded it instead on an assessment of “the quality and nature of the [defendant’s] activity [within the forum] in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” Id. at 319 . 2017The Court explained that “more realistically it may be said that those authorized acts were of such a nature as to justify the fiction.” Id. 7 The Court thus shifted the federal constitutional basis for exercising jurisdiction over foreign corporations away from conclusory terms like “presence” and legal fictions like “implied consent” and grounded it instead on an assessment of “the quality and nature of the [defendant’s] activity [within the forum] in relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.” Id. at 319 . | 1 | 9 |
State Ex Rel. Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Popegreen2 sentences2013Because Oregon does not have a due process clause in its constitution that would impose a state constitutional limit on jurisdiction, we are guided by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States that address the constitutionality of an invocation of jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 2 Circus Circus, 317 Or at 156 . 1995See State ex rel Jones v. Crook-ham, 296 Or 735, 742 , 681 P2d 103 (1984) (Linde, J., concurring) (because Oregon does not have a due process clause in its state constitution, ORCP 4 L means, in practice, that an Oregon court has jurisdiction to the limits of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment; those limits are ‘an issue of federal law to be decided pursuant to the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court’).” State ex rel Circus Circus Reno, Inc. v. Pope, 317 Or 151, 156 , 854 P2d 461 (1993) (footnotes omitted). | 1 | 4 |
Dowling v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024The Supreme Court considered whether admission of that type of evidence “failed the due process test of ‘fundamental fairness.’ ” 493 US at 352 . 2024The Court considered whether admission of that type of evidence “failed the due process test of ‘funda- mental fairness.’ ” Id. | 1 | 4 |
Mathews v. Eldridgegreen2 sentences1983Therefore, in the abosence of some compelling public interest in giving Art 1, § 10, of our constitution a broader interpretation in this situation than that given to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by the federal courts, we decline to adopt such a construction. * * *" 276 Or. at 664 n. 2, 556 P.2d 1340 . [3] In Memphis Light Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 , 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1565 , 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978), the Court said: "Ordinarily, due process of law requires an opportunity for `some kind of hearing' prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest. * * * 1983Therefore, in the abosence of some compelling public interest in giving Art 1, § 10, of our constitution a broader interpretation in this situation than that given to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment by the federal courts, we decline to adopt such a construction. * * *" 276 Or. at 664 n. 2, 556 P.2d 1340 . [3] In Memphis Light Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19 , 98 S.Ct. 1554, 1565 , 56 L.Ed.2d 30 (1978), the Court said: "Ordinarily, due process of law requires an opportunity for `some kind of hearing' prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest. * * * | 1 | 4 |
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.green2 sentences2025That passage refers, by express citation, to the use tax at issue in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 US 298, 306-308 , 112 S Ct 1904 , 119 L Ed 2d 91 (1992), overruled on other grounds, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 585 US 162 , 138 S Ct 2080 , 201 L Ed 2d 403 (2018). 2020Under that approach, “[i]t is settled law that a business need not have a physical presence in a State to satisfy the demands of due process.” Wayfair, ___ US at ___, 138 S Ct at 2093 (citation 9 Kaestner, decided after oral argument in this case, provides a helpful sum- mary of the due process analysis but is otherwise inapposite due to its factual dissimilarity. 56 Ooma, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev. omitted). | 1 | 3 |
| United States v. Mariongreen | 1 | 3 |
| Mullaney v. Wilburgreen | 1 | 3 |
| Dixon v. Lovegreen | 1 | 3 |
| State v. Cookmangreen | 1 | 3 |
| North Carolina Dept. of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trustgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Becklin v. Board of Examiners for Engineering & Land Surveyinggreen | 1 | 2 |
| Holbrook v. Flynngreen | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2025“The due process clause of the federal constitution prohibits a prosecutor from withholding evidence favorable to the defense and material to the question of guilt or pun- ishment.” State v. Warren, 304 Or 428, 430 , 746 P2d 711 (1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 , 83 S Ct 1194 , 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963)). 3 The duty to disclose such evi- dence “encompasses impeachment evidence as well as excul- patory evidence.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 US 263, 280 , 119 S Ct 1936 , 144 L Ed 2d 286 (1999). 2025“The due process clause of the federal constitution prohibits a prosecutor from withholding evidence favorable to the defense and material to the question of guilt or pun- ishment.” State v. Warren, 304 Or 428, 430 , 746 P2d 711 (1987) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83, 87 , 83 S Ct 1194 , 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963)). 3 The duty to disclose such evi- dence “encompasses impeachment evidence as well as excul- patory evidence.” Strickler v. Greene, 527 US 263, 280 , 119 S Ct 1936 , 144 L Ed 2d 286 (1999). | 6 | 1978–2025 |
Stogsdill v. Board of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision
green
2 sentences2018"In applying [the second Mathews factor] to * * * the standard of proof, the Court has explained that 'the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.' " Stogsdill , 342 Or. at 340 , 154 P.3d 91 (quoting Santosky , 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ). 2018"In applying [the second Mathews factor] to * * * the standard of proof, the Court has explained that 'the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.' " Stogsdill , 342 Or. at 340 , 154 P.3d 91 (quoting Santosky , 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ). | 5 | 2007–2026 |
Wasman v. United States
green
2 sentences2026Cite as 347 Or App 199 (2026) 203 unable to establish the presumption of improper motive, the defendant may show a due process violation by affirmatively proving actual vindictiveness, as explained in Wasman v. United States, 468 US 559, 569 , 104 S Ct 3217 , 82 L Ed 2d 424 (1984), with proof that an improper motive—such as state- ments by the judge demonstrating actual vindictiveness— caused the “more severe” subsequent sentence. 2026Cite as 347 Or App 199 (2026) 203 unable to establish the presumption of improper motive, the defendant may show a due process violation by affirmatively proving actual vindictiveness, as explained in Wasman v. United States, 468 US 559, 569 , 104 S Ct 3217 , 82 L Ed 2d 424 (1984), with proof that an improper motive—such as state- ments by the judge demonstrating actual vindictiveness— caused the “more severe” subsequent sentence. | 5 | 2017–2026 |
Santosky v. Kramer
green
2 sentences2018"In applying [the second Mathews factor] to * * * the standard of proof, the Court has explained that 'the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.' " Stogsdill , 342 Or. at 340 , 154 P.3d 91 (quoting Santosky , 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ). 2018"In applying [the second Mathews factor] to * * * the standard of proof, the Court has explained that 'the minimum standard of proof tolerated by the due process requirement reflects not only the weight of the private and public interests affected, but also a societal judgment about how the risk of error should be distributed between the litigants.' " Stogsdill , 342 Or. at 340 , 154 P.3d 91 (quoting Santosky , 455 U.S. at 755 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 ). | 5 | 1982–2018 |
Patterson v. New York
green
2 sentences2026For example, in Patterson v. New York, 432 US 197, 198 , 97 S Ct 2319 , 53 L Ed 2d 281 (1977), the Court rejected a due process challenge to a New York statute that allocated to a defendant charged with murder the burden of proving that the defendant’s conduct was the result of an extreme emotional disturbance. 2026For example, in Patterson v. New York, 432 US 197, 198 , 97 S Ct 2319 , 53 L Ed 2d 281 (1977), the Court rejected a due process challenge to a New York statute that allocated to a defendant charged with murder the burden of proving that the defendant’s conduct was the result of an extreme emotional disturbance. | 4 | 1980–2026 |
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota Ex Rel. Heitkamp
red
2 sentences2021The Court in Quill suggested that the Commerce Clause test under Complete Auto “encompasses” Due Process requirements, such that every tax that survives Commerce Clause scrutiny also is valid under the Due Process Clause. 504 US at 313 Cite as 24 OTR 562 (2021) 593 n 7.18 In Wayfair, the Court did not describe satisfaction of the Due Process standard as a prerequisite to survival of a tax under the Commerce Clause. 2021The Court in Quill suggested that the Commerce Clause test under Complete Auto “encompasses” Due Process requirements, such that every tax that survives Commerce Clause scrutiny also is valid under the Due Process Clause. 504 US at 313 Cite as 24 OTR 562 (2021) 593 n 7.18 In Wayfair, the Court did not describe satisfaction of the Due Process standard as a prerequisite to survival of a tax under the Commerce Clause. | 4 | 1992–2025 |
Goldberg v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2025In espousing first things first, Justice Linde related two anecdotes, that I recount here in full: “[L]awyers once came to our court trying to fit a woman’s right to operate a day care center within the due process analysis of Goldberg v. Kelly[, 397 US 254 , 90 S Ct 1011 , 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970)]. 2025In espousing first things first, Justice Linde related two anecdotes, that I recount here in full: “[L]awyers once came to our court trying to fit a woman’s right to operate a day care center within the due process analysis of Goldberg v. Kelly[, 397 US 254 , 90 S Ct 1011 , 25 L Ed 2d 287 (1970)]. | 4 | 1979–2025 |
Medina v. California
green
2 sentences2024“Contemporary practice” may also be considered, but it is “of limited relevance to the due process inquiry.” Medina, 505 US at 447 . 382 State v. Aranda It is defendant’s burden to affirmatively show that the principle that he seeks to apply is “entrenched in the central values of our legal system.” That is, it is not suffi- cient that defendant may be able to show that the state’s rule is not deeply rooted; he must demonstrate the funda- mental nature of the rule that he contends is essential to due process. 2024“Contemporary practice” may also be considered, but it is “of limited relevance to the due process inquiry.” Medina, 505 US at 447 . 382 State v. Aranda It is defendant’s burden to affirmatively show that the principle that he seeks to apply is “entrenched in the central values of our legal system.” That is, it is not suffi- cient that defendant may be able to show that the state’s rule is not deeply rooted; he must demonstrate the funda- mental nature of the rule that he contends is essential to due process. | 4 | 1994–2024 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2023Williams states that “in a prosecution for child sexual abuse, the [United States Supreme] Court would hold that subjecting proffered ‘other acts’ evidence to OEC 403 balancing is a due process requirement.” 357 Or at 18 . 2017In Williams , the court reasoned that OEC 404(4)(a) made OEC 403 applicable “to the extent required by the United States Constitution,” and concluded that, “in a prosecution for child sexual abuse, the [United States Supreme] Court would hold that subjecting proffered ‘other acts’ evidence to OEC 403 balancing is a due process requirement.” Id. at 15-18 . | 4 | 2015–2023 |
Cole v. STATE BY & THROUGH OR. DEPT. OF REV.
green
2 sentences1991However, section 10 is “neither in text nor in historical function the equivalent of a due process clause.” Cole v. Dept. of Rev., 294 Or 188, 191 , 655 P2d 171 (1982). 1991However, section 10 is “neither in text nor in historical function the equivalent of a due process clause.” Cole v. Dept. of Rev., 294 Or 188, 191 , 655 P2d 171 (1982). | 4 | 1985–1991 |
State v. Benson
green
2 sentences2026Those arguments are too speculative to show “actual, substantial prejudice.” See Benson, 370 Or at 72 Nonprecedential Memo Op: 346 Or App 847 (2026) 849 (noting that “a defendant alleging a due process violation based on a preindictment delay faces a high bar to establish- ing actual, substantial prejudice”). 2026Those arguments are too speculative to show “actual, substantial prejudice.” See Benson, 370 Or at 72 Nonprecedential Memo Op: 346 Or App 847 (2026) 849 (noting that “a defendant alleging a due process violation based on a preindictment delay faces a high bar to establish- ing actual, substantial prejudice”). | 3 | 2022–2026 |
Febuary v. State of Oregon
green
2 sentences2017Murphy, Jr., Limits on Enhanced Sentences Following Appeal and Retrial: Has Pearce Been Pierced?, 19 Conn L Rev 973, 988-95 (1986-87). 10 We note that, even when the presumption of vindictivess does not apply, a defendant always may demonstrate a due process violation by “affirmatively proving] actual vindictiveness.” Febuary, 361 Or at 658 (quoting Wasman v. United States, 468 US 559, 569 , 104 S Ct 3217 , 82 L Ed 2d 424 (1984)). 11 As noted, defendant objected to the new allegations, but the trial court permitted them and defendant does not raise that issue in this court. 2017Although the state did not seek departure sentences in defendant’s original prosecution, it did so on remand.11 On 10 We note that, even when the presumption of vindictivess does not apply, a defendant always may demonstrate a due process violation by “affirmatively prov[ing] actual vindictiveness.” Febuary, 361 Or at 558 (quoting Wasman v. United States, 468 US 559, 569 , 104 S Ct 3217 , 82 L Ed 2d 424 (1984)). 11 As noted, defendant objected to the new allegations, but the trial court permitted them and defendant does not raise that issue in this court. | 3 | 2017–2026 |
Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota
green
2 sentences2021Dept., 419 US 560 , 95 S Ct 706 , 42 L Ed 2d 719 (1975); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 US 436 , 84 S Ct 1564 , 12 L Ed 2d 430 (1964); Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 US 450 , 79 S Ct 357 , 3 L Ed 2d 421 (1959); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 US 80 , 68 S Ct 1475 , 92 L Ed 1932 (1948); Illinois Cent. 2021Dept., 419 US 560 , 95 S Ct 706 , 42 L Ed 2d 719 (1975); General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 US 436 , 84 S Ct 1564 , 12 L Ed 2d 430 (1964); Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 US 450 , 79 S Ct 357 , 3 L Ed 2d 421 (1959); Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 US 80 , 68 S Ct 1475 , 92 L Ed 1932 (1948); Illinois Cent. | 3 | 1963–2021 |
Duncan v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2020The limited scope of Johnson had a somewhat technical reason behind it: the defendant 308 State v. Flores Ramos in Johnson had been convicted in a state court before the Court had issued its opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145 , 88 S Ct 1444 , 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968), which had incor- porated the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 2020The limited scope of Johnson had a somewhat technical reason behind it: the defendant 308 State v. Flores Ramos in Johnson had been convicted in a state court before the Court had issued its opinion in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 US 145 , 88 S Ct 1444 , 20 L Ed 2d 491 (1968), which had incor- porated the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial right to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. | 3 | 1969–2020 |
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson
green
2 sentences1993ORCP 4L provides for personal jurisdiction over a defendant, “[njotwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirements of sections B through K of this rule, in any action where prosecution of the action against a defendant in this state is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States.” In determining whether a court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant under ORCP 4L, this court is guided by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the constitutionality of such exercise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amen 1993ORCP 4L provides for personal jurisdiction over a defendant, “[njotwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirements of sections B through K of this rule, in any action where prosecution of the action against a defendant in this state is not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States.” In determining whether a court may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant under ORCP 4L, this court is guided by decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States regarding the constitutionality of such exercise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amen | 3 | 1993–2019 |
| United States v. Goodwin green | 3 | 2001–2017 |
| North Carolina v. Pearce red | 3 | 2000–2017 |
| Frederick v. Douglas County green | 3 | 2004–2013 |
| Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co. green | 3 | 2004–2011 |
| In Re WINSHIP green | 3 | 1979–1993 |
| State v. Wanrow red | 2 | 2026–2026 |
| In Re Personal Restraint of Andress red | 2 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Osborne neutral | 2 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Merrell neutral | 2 | 2026–2026 |
| Hysler v. Florida green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| Napue v. Illinois green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Warren green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| Strickler v. Greene green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Webb green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| State v. Berglund green | 2 | 2021–2025 |
| State v. T. C. green | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| American Refrigerator Transit Co. v. State Tax Commission green | 2 | 1969–2025 |
| Perkins v. Fhuere neutral | 2 | 2025–2025 |
| BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore green | 2 | 2002–2024 |
| State v. K. G. neutral | 2 | 2024–2024 |
| California v. Trombetta green | 2 | 2012–2024 |
| Scharfstein v. BP W. Coast Prods., LLC green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| State v. Bray green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| Mccormick v. State green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
| Citgo Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Frescati Shipping Co. green | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.