due process clause in District of Columbia

2015Estoppel may not cure or render harmless the deprivation of the jury trial right, but at a minimum it would serve a prudential purpose by encouraging the government to avail itself of expert government resources on immigration law and presenting them to the court and the defense before opposing a motion for jury trial. 42 persons who are “similarly situated.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 , 373- 74 (1886); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (noting that “equal protection of the laws” is a more specific safeguard encompassed within the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause); Smi

2007"Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 , 74 S.Ct. 693 , 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954), reads the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause into the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to apply it to the District of Columbia.” Green, 310 A.2d at 855 n. 15.

2025The court made the following primary points: (1) Congress intended the District’s long-arm statute to “permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution,” id. at 810-11 ; (2) Congress did not intend to set aside the government-contacts exception when it enacted the long-arm statute, id. at 813 ; (3) the government-contacts exception “does not hinge upon the wording of the statute,” id.; (4) “[t]o permit our local courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose sole contact

2025The court made the following primary points: (1) Congress intended the District’s long-arm statute to “permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution,” id. at 810-11 ; (2) Congress did not intend to set aside the government-contacts exception when it enacted the long-arm statute, id. at 813 ; (3) the government-contacts exception “does not hinge upon the wording of the statute,” id.; (4) “[t]o permit our local courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose sole contact

1978According to the Supreme Court, “the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings ... is fundamental fairness,” with an emphasis on assuring fact-finding procedures which are “accurate.” McKeiver , supra, 403 U.S. at 543 , 91 S.Ct. 1976 .

1978According to the Supreme Court, “the applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings ... is fundamental fairness,” with an emphasis on assuring fact-finding procedures which are “accurate.” McKeiver , supra, 403 U.S. at 543 , 91 S.Ct. 1976 .

1982The Supreme Court, in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) stated that [ United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)] makes clear that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.

1982The Supreme Court, in United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 , 97 S.Ct. 2044, 2048 , 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) stated that [ United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 , 92 S.Ct. 455 , 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971)] makes clear that proof of prejudice is generally a necessary but not sufficient element of a due process claim, and that the due process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as well as the prejudice to the accused.

1997The record on appeal reveals that the detective assigned to Mr. Day’s matter transmitted the case to the United States Attorney’s office about two months after the accident, but presentation to the grand jury was delayed because of difficulty “getting the witnesses together at one time.” The detective “had trouble finding witnesses or one of the witnesses was admitted to the hospital and was unable to come in....” 5 We are aware of no high court state case, and Mr. Day has cited none, in which gross governmental negligence in seeking an indictment has been held to rise to the level of intentio

1995We have said that "with the possible exception of a showing of severe prejudice from pre-arrest delay, such delay will not support a due process claim when the government's actions have been negligent, but not reckless or intentional." Smith v. United States, 414 A.2d 1189, 1195 (D.C.1980); Robinson v. United States, 478 A.2d 1065, 1066 (D.C.1984). [17] Prejudice to the accused is a factor to be considered in the speedy trial analysis.

2019Undue delay may result in a due process violation, however, if the respondent demonstrates actual prejudice-that is, that the delay in prosecution "impaired [her] defense." Williams , 513 A.2d at 797 .

2019Because we are not aware of any disciplinary case in which we have applied the doctrine of laches, and because we have applied the due process framework set out above to claims of undue delay in this context in the past, see, e.g. , In re Saint-Louis , 147 A.3d at 1148 ; In re Williams , 513 A.2d at 795 -97 , we interpret Ms. Ekekwe-Kauffman's laches argument as one asserting a due process violation.

2008We have recognized that the “transacting any business” provision of section 13^423(a)(l) “permit[s] the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the extent permitted by the due process clause of the United States Constitution.” Environmental Research Int’l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 810-811 (D.C.1976) (en banc); accord, e.g., Mouzavires, 434 A.2d at 991 (“this statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent permissible under the due process clause” (citations omitted)).

1998The differences in the views of the judges are reflected in the orders of June 22, 1994, and December 15, 1995, in this case; in Duffy v. Shoppers Food Warehouse, CA No. 93-2372 (D.D.C.), 1994 WL 151204 , at 3 and in the order of July 31, 1995, transferring the matter to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. .We have held previously that "the ‘transacting any business’ provision is coextensive with the due process clause." Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 992 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 , 102 S.Ct. 1643 , 71 L.Ed.2d 875 (198

2016Id. at 68-69 . 39 at 651,31 may not be terminated without a predicate determination, by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is unfit to parent.32 Thus, while we have recognized the “best interest of the child” as the decisive factor in determining whether to ultimately terminate parental rights in a neglect proceeding, it is critical that the trial court make a parental unfitness determination before undertaking a “best interests of the child” analysis.33 Here, the trial court failed to make a ____________________ 31 See also Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (“[A parent

2016Id. at 68-69 . 39 at 651,31 may not be terminated without a predicate determination, by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is unfit to parent.32 Thus, while we have recognized the “best interest of the child” as the decisive factor in determining whether to ultimately terminate parental rights in a neglect proceeding, it is critical that the trial court make a parental unfitness determination before undertaking a “best interests of the child” analysis.33 Here, the trial court failed to make a ____________________ 31 See also Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (“[A parent

2011This means that the non-resident defendant’s conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Gonzalez v. Internacional de Elevadores, S.A., 891 A.2d 227, 234 (D.C.2006) (alterations in original) (quotation marks and citations omitted). “[U]nder the due process clause, the minimum contacts *728 principle requires us to examine the quality and nature of the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the District and whether those contacts are voluntary and deliberate or only random, fortuitous, tenuous and accidental.” Shoppers

2001See id. at 329 (“[S]ection 13-23(a)(1) is coextensive in reach with the personal jurisdiction allowed by the due process clause.”).

2004In addition, the trial court found that D.M.’s version of the story had “ample corroboration.” “ ‘[I]n the absence of severe prejudice, pre-arrest delay will not support a due process claim when the government’s actions have been negligent, but not reckless or intentional.’” United States v. Day, 697 A.2d 31, 34 (D.C.1997) (quoting Dahl Robinson v. United States, 478 A.2d 1065, 1066 (D.C.1984) (citation omitted)) (alteration in original).

1997The record on appeal reveals that the detective assigned to Mr. Day’s matter transmitted the case to the United States Attorney’s office about two months after the accident, but presentation to the grand jury was delayed because of difficulty “getting the witnesses together at one time.” The detective “had trouble finding witnesses or one of the witnesses was admitted to the hospital and was unable to come in....” 5 We are aware of no high court state case, and Mr. Day has cited none, in which gross governmental negligence in seeking an indictment has been held to rise to the level of intentio

2017The Supreme Court made clear in Manson that corroborative evidence external to an identification “plays no part” in the due process analysis of the reliability of the identification. 432 U.S. at 116 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 .

2017The Supreme Court made clear in Manson that corroborative evidence external to an identification “plays no part” in the due process analysis of the reliability of the identification. 432 U.S. at 116 , 97 S.Ct. 2243 .

1991The District of Columbia long-arm statute provides that a District of Columbia court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who transacts any business in the District, and we have held that this jurisdictional reach is coextensive with due process; i.e., our statute "permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent of the Due Process Clause." Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 991 (D.C.1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 , 102 S.Ct. 1643 , 71 L.Ed.2d 875 (1982); see also Hummel v. Koehler, 458 A.2d 1187, 1190 (D.C. 1983). [2] "Thus, we have merged

1991The District of Columbia long-arm statute provides that a District of Columbia court may exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who transacts any business in the District, and we have held that this jurisdictional reach is coextensive with due process; i.e., our statute “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest extent of the Due Process Clause.” Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 991 (D.C.1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 , 102 S.Ct. 1643 , 71 L.Ed.2d 875 (1982); see also Hummel v. Koehler, 458 A.2d 1187, 1190 (D.C.1983). 2 “Thus, we have merged the

1998The differences in the views of the judges are reflected in the orders of June 22, 1994, and December 15, 1995, in this case; in Duffy v. Shoppers Food Warehouse, CA No. 93-2372 (D.D.C.), 1994 WL 151204 , at 3 and in the order of July 31, 1995, transferring the matter to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. .We have held previously that "the ‘transacting any business’ provision is coextensive with the due process clause." Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 992 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 , 102 S.Ct. 1643 , 71 L.Ed.2d 875 (198

1998The differences in the views of the judges are reflected in the orders of June 22, 1994, and December 15, 1995, in this case; in Duffy v. Shoppers Food Warehouse, CA No. 93-2372 (D.D.C.), 1994 WL 151204 , at 3 and in the order of July 31, 1995, transferring the matter to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. .We have held previously that "the ‘transacting any business’ provision is coextensive with the due process clause." Mouzavires v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 992 (D.C.1981) (en banc) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 , 102 S.Ct. 1643 , 71 L.Ed.2d 875 (198

2022We have held, however, that “mere delay in the disciplinary process generally does not provide a legitimate ground for dismissal of the complaint,” because “[t]he public interest in regulating members of the bar takes precedence over the attorney’s interest in having claims speedily resolved.” In re Morrell, 684 A.2d 361, 368 (D.C. 1996); see also, e.g., In re Pearson, 228 A.3d 417 , 427 n.13 (D.C. 2020) (per curiam) (“It clearly is not an ideal practice to delay prosecutions for seven years, but even troubling and inexcusable delays, without more, will not rise to a due process violation that

2010See In re Ponds, 888 A.2d 234 , 241 n. 22 (D.C.2005) (“A delay coupled with actual prejudice could result in a due process violation.... ”); In re Morrell, 684 A.2d 361, 368 (D.C.1996) (same).

2015This right is intertwined with a defendant’s right to allocute and speak to the issue of appropriate punishment, a right which is acknowledged by statute 30 and court rule, 31 but ultimately is “a fundamental one which implicates the due process clause.” Warrick v. United States, 551 A.2d 1332, 1334 (D.C.1988).

2005This court has recognized that the right to be present upon the imposition of a sentence “is a fundamental [right] which implicates the due process clause.” Warrick v. United States, 551 A.2d 1332, 1334 (D.C.1988) (citing United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 1482 , 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (per curiam)) (other citations omitted).

2012Rather, “ ‘[t]o violate due process, an inconsistency must exist at the core of the prosecutor’s cases ... for the same crime,’ and the inconsistency ‘must have rendered unreliable’ the resulting conviction.” Boyd, 908 A.2d at 51-52 (alteration in original) (quoting Clay, 367 F.3d at 1004 ); see Smith, 205 F.3d at 1052 (“To violate due process, an inconsistency must exist at the core of the prosecutor’s cases against defendants for the same crime.”); Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 77 , 857 A.2d 65, 79-82 (2004) (collecting cases and holding, “[biased on our analysis of the relevant ease law, ... tha

2006This court has recently had occasion to recognize the existence of a growing body of law which stands for the general proposition that “where multiple defendants are tried separately, the due process clause is violated where the prosecution presents inconsistent theories at them trials.” Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1105 (D.C.2005); see also Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir.2000); Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (plurality opinion), rev’d on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 , 118 S.Ct. 1489 , 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998); Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594, 6

2006Such an argument surely does not comport with the due process requirement that the exercise of personal jurisdiction not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 .

2006Such an argument surely does not comport with the due process requirement that the exercise of personal jurisdiction not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 .

1978Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132 , 439 F.2d 642 (1971), where sanctions were imposed because the prosecuting authority failed to comply with the due process requirement of disclosure.

1978Cf. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 83 S.Ct. 1194 , 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), United States v. Bryant, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 132 , 439 F.2d 642 (1971), where sanctions were imposed because the prosecuting authority failed to comply with the due process requirement of disclosure.

1990The court relied substantially on Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 , 101 S.Ct. 654 , 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981), in which the Supreme Court held that the due process clause does not require a hearing out of the jury's presence whenever a defendant claims an identification was obtained improperly. 113 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1451.

1990The court relied substantially on Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341 , 101 S.Ct. 654 , 66 L.Ed.2d 549 (1981), in which the Supreme Court held that the due process clause does not require a hearing out of the jury's presence whenever a defendant claims an identification was obtained improperly. 113 Daily Wash.L.Rptr. at 1451.

2025This court addressed the government-contacts exception again two years later in Rose. 394 A.2d at 1372-74 .

2025The court in Rose reiterated that Congress intended the D.C. long-arm statute “to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over 6 nonresident defendants to the full extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Id. at 1369 .

2016Cf. In re Richardson, 692 A.2d 427, 434 (D.C. 1997) (“[A]s a consequence of Richardson’s Florida waiver, we are entitled to rely—for purposes of final, reciprocal discipline—on the disciplinary result in Florida, properly certified to this court, without affording Richardson the evidentiary hearing [he waived].

2016Cf. In re Richardson, 692 A.2d 427, 434 (D.C. 1997) (“[A]s a consequence of Richardson’s Florida waiver, we are entitled to rely—for purposes of. final, reciprocal discipline—on the disciplinary result in Florida, properly certified to this court, without affording Richardson the ev-identiary hearing [he waived].

2016Id. at 68-69 . 39 at 651,31 may not be terminated without a predicate determination, by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is unfit to parent.32 Thus, while we have recognized the “best interest of the child” as the decisive factor in determining whether to ultimately terminate parental rights in a neglect proceeding, it is critical that the trial court make a parental unfitness determination before undertaking a “best interests of the child” analysis.33 Here, the trial court failed to make a ____________________ 31 See also Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (“[A parent

2016Id. at 68-69 . 39 at 651,31 may not be terminated without a predicate determination, by clear and convincing evidence that the individual is unfit to parent.32 Thus, while we have recognized the “best interest of the child” as the decisive factor in determining whether to ultimately terminate parental rights in a neglect proceeding, it is critical that the trial court make a parental unfitness determination before undertaking a “best interests of the child” analysis.33 Here, the trial court failed to make a ____________________ 31 See also Lehr v. Robinson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (“[A parent

2012Not every inconsistency in the government’s presentation of evidence, however, rises to the level of a due process violation. “[T]he presence of factual inconsistency, without more, will not give rise to a due-process violation.” Boyd, 908 A.2d at 51 ; see Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1058-59 (“[W]hen there are claims of inconsistent prosecutorial conduct, reversal is not required where the underlying theory ‘remains consistent.’ ”) (quoting Haynes v. Cupp, 827 F.2d 435, 439 (9th Cir.1987)).

2006This court has recently had occasion to recognize the existence of a growing body of law which stands for the general proposition that “where multiple defendants are tried separately, the due process clause is violated where the prosecution presents inconsistent theories at them trials.” Hammond v. United States, 880 A.2d 1066, 1105 (D.C.2005); see also Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir.2000); Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir.1997) (en banc) (plurality opinion), rev’d on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 , 118 S.Ct. 1489 , 140 L.Ed.2d 728 (1998); Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594, 6