due process clause in Colorado

2026See People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257 , 262 (Colo. App. 2007) (a parent may not obtain relief on a due process claim absent a showing of harm or prejudice).1 IV.

2026See C.A.R. 35(c); People in Interest of R.J., 2019 COA 109, ¶ 22 (an error or defect only requires reversal if it affects a substantial right, meaning that it can be said with fair assurance that the error or defect substantially influenced the case’s outcome or impaired the basic fairness of the trial itself); see also People in Interest of J.A.S., 160 P.3d 257 , 262 (Colo. App. 2007) (even for a due process claim, a parent may not obtain relief absent a showing of harm or prejudice). 8 ¶ 20 Mother contends that she was prejudiced because, during the two months she was without a GAL or an att

2026See Braunthal, 31 P.3d at 175 (“[A]ll three prongs of the [destruction of evidence test] must be satisfied in order for [the defendant] to establish a due process violation.”). ¶ 43 Fenstermacher asserts that the exculpatory value of the cell phone was apparent because the search warrant sought the cell phone to uncover inculpatory evidence.

2026“When it is reasonably foreseeable that evidence may be favorable to the accused, the prosecution must employ procedures to preserve such evidence.” Id. ¶ 66 To establish a due process violation based on the state’s failure to preserve potentially exculpatory evidence, a defendant must show that “(1) the state suppressed or destroyed the evidence; (2) the evidence had an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed; and (3) he was unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” People v. Eason, 2022 COA 54 , ¶ 37.

2026A defendant seeking “relief on a due process claim arising from an incomplete record . . . must always demonstrate specific prejudice resulting from the state of that record.” Id. at 301 . ¶ 12 We review de novo whether the record is sufficient for appellate review.

2014Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 , 76 S.Ct. 585 , 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956); People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 300 (Colo.1996). "[TJ]o obtain relief on a due process claim arising from an incomplete ree-ord, a defendant must always demonstrate specific prejudice resulting from the state of that record." Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 301 {emphasis in original). 140 Hoang alleges numerous errors and omissions in the appellate record.

2007See People in Interest of A.L.B., 994 P.2d 476, 480 (Colo.App.1999).

2007See People in Interest of A.L.B., 994 P.2d 476, 480 (Colo.App.1999).

2025See Eason, ¶¶ 41-48 (inadvertent deletion of body camera footage documenting an officer’s conversation with witnesses was not a due process violation because the footage’s apparent exculpatory value was speculative); People v. Wyman, 788 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Colo. 1990) (“The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not invariably require a state to preserve evidence . . . ‘of which no more can be 9 said than [that] it would have been subjected to tests.’” (citation omitted)); People v. Young, 2014 COA 169 , ¶ 75 (when further DNA testing of a piece of evidence may or may not have yield

2025See Eason, ¶¶ 41-48 (inadvertent deletion of body camera footage documenting an officer’s conversation with witnesses was not a due process violation because the footage’s apparent exculpatory value was speculative); People v. Wyman, 788 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Colo. 1990) (“The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not invariably require a state to preserve evidence . . . ‘of which no more can be 9 said than [that] it would have been subjected to tests.’” (citation omitted)); People v. Young, 2014 COA 169 , ¶ 75 (when further DNA testing of a piece of evidence may or may not have yield

2025II, [§] 25, and that its substantive application is the same insofar as equal 7 protection analysis is concerned.” Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1014 (Colo. 1982). ¶ 13 “The threshold inquiry in an equal protection analysis is whether persons who are similarly situated are subjected to disparate treatment by a governmental act.” Movitz v. Div. of Emp. & Training, 820 P.2d 1153, 1155 (Colo. App. 1991).

2013II, see. 25, and that its substantive application is the same insofar as equal protection analysis is concerned." Lujan v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1014 (Colo.1982).

1999See People v. Nissen, 650 P.2d 547, 550 (Colo.1982); Missourians for Tax Justice Educ.

1998See Buckallew, 848 P.2d at 907 ; People v. Nissen, 650 P.2d 547, 549 (Colo.1982). *415 The due process requirement that a statute clearly define the prohibited conduct is not relaxed simply because the statute delegates certain decisions to an agent or agency.

1990Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344 , 96 S.Ct. at 2077 ; Sinderman, 408 U.S. at 601 , 92 S.Ct. at 2699 ; Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. at 2709 . *695 Courts addressing this issue have generally held that when state law recognizes that employee handbooks may form the basis of a contract action, the personnel policies and regulations in question determine whether the employee possessed a legitimate claim of entitlement under the due process clause.

1990Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344 , 96 S.Ct. at 2077 ; Sinderman, 408 U.S. at 601 , 92 S.Ct. at 2699 ; Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. at 2709 . *695 Courts addressing this issue have generally held that when state law recognizes that employee handbooks may form the basis of a contract action, the personnel policies and regulations in question determine whether the employee possessed a legitimate claim of entitlement under the due process clause.

1994Colorado recognized the due process claim of outrageous-governmental conduct in Bailey v. People, 630 P.2d 1062 (Colo.1981).

1991Colorado recognized the due process claim of outrageous governmental conduct in Bailey v. People, 630 P.2d 1062 (Colo.1981).

2025If the cell phone data wasn’t “apparently exculpatory, but only potentially useful, [Blake could] alternatively establish[] a due process violation if he shows that the [prosecution] suppressed or destroyed the evidence in bad faith.” Id. (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 57-58 (1988)).

2025See Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58 ; People v. Wyman, 788 P.2d 1278, 1279 (Colo. 1990). ¶ 22 If a defendant establishes that a due process violation has occurred because of the destruction of evidence, the court may impose various remedial sanctions, including dismissal of the case, dismissal of particular claims, or other less severe sanctions.

2016See Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 304 (holding that defendant "suffered a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation" where the court denied him "parity with the prosecution in the exercise of peremptory challenges"); Macrander, 828 P.2d at 238 (noting that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process" and "the right to challenge a juror for cause has been recognized as an integral part of a fair trial"); see also Novotny, I 19, 320 P.8d at 1200 CTWle have, in the past. ... merely categorized the affected right as ‘substantial’ based on the significance of the right itself." (

2016See Lefebre, 5 P.3d at 304 (holding that defendant "suffered a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation" where the court denied him "parity with the prosecution in the exercise of peremptory challenges"); Macrander, 828 P.2d at 238 (noting that "[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process" and "the right to challenge a juror for cause has been recognized as an integral part of a fair trial"); see also Novotny, I 19, 320 P.8d at 1200 CTWle have, in the past. ... merely categorized the affected right as ‘substantial’ based on the significance of the right itself." (

2020Comm’n, 182 Colo. 244, 247 , 512 P.2d 625, 627 (1973) (on a complete record, reviewing constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal); Robinson v. People, 173 Colo. 113, 116 , 476 P.2d 262, 263 (1970) (reviewing, for the first time on appeal, a due process challenge). 11 30-20-101(3) creates an ambiguity, we consider the rest of the SWA, including its legislative history, and conclude that the General Assembly was aware that counties could be violators of the SWA and therefore subject to enforcement actions brought by the Department. 1.

2020Comm’n, 182 Colo. 244, 247 , 512 P.2d 625, 627 (1973) (on a complete record, reviewing constitutional challenge for the first time on appeal); Robinson v. People, 173 Colo. 113, 116 , 476 P.2d 262, 263 (1970) (reviewing, for the first time on appeal, a due process challenge). 11 30-20-101(3) creates an ambiguity, we consider the rest of the SWA, including its legislative history, and conclude that the General Assembly was aware that counties could be violators of the SWA and therefore subject to enforcement actions brought by the Department. 1.

2025But the Colorado Supreme Court disavowed the “reasonable person” standard — which stemmed from People v. Morgan, 606 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Colo. 1980) — in People v. Greathouse, 742 P.2d 334, 338-39 (Colo. 1987) (holding that Morgan’s reasonable person standard was “unduly expansive” and instead instructing courts to inquire if the claimed evidence “possess[es] an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and [is] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means” (quoting Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489 )).

1996In People v. Greathouse, 742 P.2d 334, 338-39 (Colo.1987), we adopted the standard set forth in Trombetta for determining the value of exculpatory evidence in a due process claim.

2025California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984); People v. Braunthal, 31 P.3d 167, 172 (Colo. 2001). ¶ 13 To establish a due process violation for the prosecution’s failure to preserve evidence, a defendant must prove that the evidence was suppressed or destroyed by state action and that the evidence was material.

2025Thus, under Colorado law, to establish a due process violation for the prosecution’s failure to preserve evidence, a defendant must prove that “(1) the evidence was destroyed by state action; (2) the evidence possessed an exculpatory value that was apparent before it was destroyed; and 6 (3) the defendant was unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Id. ¶ 14 “[W]hen evidence can be collected and preserved in the performance of routine procedures by state agents, failure to do so is tantamount to suppression of the evidence . . . .” People ex rel.

1996See People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100 , 198 P. 150 (1921) (equal protection of law is included in the due process clause).

1996See People v. Max, 70 Colo. 100 , 198 P. 150 (1921) (equal protection of law is included in the due process clause).

2026See People v. Scarlett, 985 P.2d 36, 39 (Colo. App. 1998). ¶ 67 “If we determine that a due process violation occurred, then we must decide whether the district court ‘fashioned an appropriate remedy, [while] recognizing that the trial court has broad discretion in this regard.’” Eason, ¶ 39 (quoting People v. Enriquez, 763 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Colo. 1988)).

2026“In determining the appropriate remedy for the state’s destruction of evidence amounting to a due process violation, a court should consider the state’s degree of culpability, the need to preserve the integrity of the truth-finding process, and the need for deterrence of the conduct at issue.” Id.

1990Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344 , 96 S.Ct. at 2077 ; Sinderman, 408 U.S. at 601 , 92 S.Ct. at 2699 ; Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. at 2709 . *695 Courts addressing this issue have generally held that when state law recognizes that employee handbooks may form the basis of a contract action, the personnel policies and regulations in question determine whether the employee possessed a legitimate claim of entitlement under the due process clause.

1990Bishop, 426 U.S. at 344 , 96 S.Ct. at 2077 ; Sinderman, 408 U.S. at 601 , 92 S.Ct. at 2699 ; Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 , 92 S.Ct. at 2709 . *695 Courts addressing this issue have generally held that when state law recognizes that employee handbooks may form the basis of a contract action, the personnel policies and regulations in question determine whether the employee possessed a legitimate claim of entitlement under the due process clause.

2025To the contrary, the Eason division articulated the current test for establishing a due process violation, see id. ¶¶ 37-39, and distinguished People v. Holloway, 649 P.2d 318, 319 (Colo. 1982), without endorsing or applying the test outlined in that case.

2025See Eason, ¶ 50. 8 years after the evidence is no longer available.” Id.

1986Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution an accused may not be convicted of a criminal offense "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

1986Under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution an accused may not be convicted of a criminal offense "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 , 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072 , 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970).

2003Thus, with regard to the kinds of acts described by the statute, “[tjhis interpretation obviates the need for statutory analysis separate from the due process inquiry required by International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and its progeny.” Keefe v. Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., 40 P.3d 1267, 1270 (Colo.2002)(quoting C.F.H.

2003Thus, with regard to the kinds of acts described by the statute, “[tjhis interpretation obviates the need for statutory analysis separate from the due process inquiry required by International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945), and its progeny.” Keefe v. Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., 40 P.3d 1267, 1270 (Colo.2002)(quoting C.F.H.

1994Scholz v. Metropolitan Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 , 906 n. 7 (Colo.1993); People v. Wilhelm, 676 P.2d 702 , 704 & n. 4 (Colo.1984); Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194 ,197 n. 3, 613 P.2d 884 , 886 n. 3 (1980).

1994Scholz v. Metropolitan Pathologists, P.C., 851 P.2d 901 , 906 n. 7 (Colo.1993); People v. Wilhelm, 676 P.2d 702 , 704 & n. 4 (Colo.1984); Heninger v. Charnes, 200 Colo. 194 ,197 n. 3, 613 P.2d 884 , 886 n. 3 (1980).

1991We have stated that lack of a willful violation by the prosecution “was not a defense to the charge of a discovery violation, but it was a consideration in fashioning an appropriate remedy.” People v. District Court, 793 P.2d at 167 ; see also People v. District Court, 656 P.2d at 1292 n. 11 (“The good faith or bad faith of the police in suppressing evidence is not determinative in the decision whether a due process violation has occurred.... [HJowever, prosecutorial good faith is significant in selection of the appropriate sanction for a due process violation.”); Shaw, 646 P.2d at 381 n. 10 (

1991We have stated that lack of a willful violation by the prosecution "was not a defense to the charge of a discovery violation, but it was a consideration in fashioning an appropriate remedy." People v. District Court, 793 P.2d at 167 ; see also People v. District Court, 656 P.2d at 1292 n. 11 ("The good faith or bad faith of the police in suppressing evidence is not determinative in the decision whether a due process violation has occurred.... [H]owever, prosecutorial good faith is significant in selection of the appropriate sanction for a due process violation."); Shaw, 646 P.2d at 381 n. 10 (

2014Deck explicitly stated that "where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation." 544 U.S. at 685 , 125 S.Ct. 2007 (emphasis added).

2014Deck explicitly stated that "where a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury, the defendant need not demonstrate actual prejudice to make out a due process violation." 544 U.S. at 685 , 125 S.Ct. 2007 (emphasis added).

1979We have previously recognized that the Colorado General Assembly, in enacting this statute, “intended to extend the jurisdiction of our courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Dwyer v. District Court, 188 Colo. 41, 44 , 532 P.2d 725, 726 , (1975); quoting from Safari Outfitters v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 459 , 448 P.2d 783, 784 (1969).

1979We have previously recognized that the Colorado General Assembly, in enacting this statute, “intended to extend the jurisdiction of our courts to the fullest extent permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Dwyer v. District Court, 188 Colo. 41, 44 , 532 P.2d 725, 726 , (1975); quoting from Safari Outfitters v. Superior Court, 167 Colo. 456, 459 , 448 P.2d 783, 784 (1969).